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Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting the
Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State
High Court’s Sua Sponte∗ Rejection of Indigent
Defendants’ Right to Counsel
Douglas L. Colbert∗∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

COURT: Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?
DEFENDANT: . . . I mean I’m not denying what happened . . . .
1
COURT: Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you can.

This short exchange at a bail review hearing in Maryland spoke
volumes about the need for counsel at that stage of the proceedings
and engendered a troubling state court conviction that illuminates a
criminal justice issue of national importance. The incarcerated defendant, Donald Fenner, had just been arrested for a fifty-dollar drug
2
sale. Without counsel present in court, he offered a rambling dis3
course before making his admission, probably stating whatever he
∗

“Sua sponte” rulings occur when a court raises and decides an issue “on its
own motion,” rather than deciding an issue raised by litigants. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1464 (8TH ED. 2004). This Article refers to appellate, not trial, courts’
“sua sponte” decision-making.
∗∗
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B. 1968, SUNY at
Buffalo; J.D. 1972 Rutgers (Newark) Law School.
My sincere thanks to the Maryland faculty for hosting two workshop presentations and for offering thoughtful comments and suggestions at different stages of this
Article. I am most grateful to colleagues Alan Hornstein, Renee Hutchins and Michael Pinard for their many contributions and extremely helpful comments and discussions. Maryland law students Valerie Brezina, William Gamgort, Buffy Giddens
and Paolo Pasicolan are deserving of recognition for their excellent research assistance.
1
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1023–24 (Md. 2004).
2
Reporter’s Official Transcript of Proceedings (Trial on the Merits) at 27, State
v. Fenner (Fenner I), No. 01-28360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County Jan. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript].
3
See infra text accompanying note 58 for Fenner’s complete reply to the judge’s
open-ended inquiry.

653

COLBERT FINAL.DOC

654

3/7/2006 10:42:20 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:653

4

thought might minimize the bail amount set and avoid further detention. The danger and unfairness of such an uncounseled admission was manifest to the judge. Yet that admission became central to
5
the prosecutor’s otherwise weak case. Repeatedly invoking “I’m not
6
denying what happened” like a mantra in summation, the prosecutor
7
obtained a conviction and a twenty-year sentence.
Fenner’s bail proceeding illustrates why the pretrial release or
8
bail determination hearing should be considered a “critical stage” of
9
a criminal prosecution, triggering the Sixth and Fourteenth

4

While states’ bail procedures differ, Fenner’s misguided attempt to influence
the judicial officer to set an affordable bail and avoid lengthy pretrial detention is
understandable. In Maryland’s unique two-stage bail procedure, defendants initially
appear before a district (lower) court commissioner within twenty-four hours of arrest. MD. R. 4-216(e)–(f); see infra note 48. Commissioners, like judges, are judicial
officers empowered to order release on recognizance or to designate a bail amount.
MD. R. 4-213(a)(4), 4-216. In Fenner’s case, the commissioner ordered $150,000 bail
bond. See infra Part II.B. Maryland procedures provide for judicial bail review. MD.
R. 4-216(f). Following the commissioner’s decision, Fenner appeared before a district court judge, where he made his inculpatory statement. See infra Part II.C.
5
No police officer testified to observing Fenner engage in a drug transaction or
could identify his voice on a recorded conversation. Reporter’s Official Transcript of
Proceedings (Trial on the Merits) at 273–74, 278, State v. Fenner (Fenner II), No. 0128360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County March 20–21, 2002) [hereinafter Trial II Transcript]. The State was unable to introduce corroborating marked money. Motion to
Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 49–51. The State relied on the testimony of an informant and his accomplice. Trial II Transcript, supra, at 146–47,
182–84. See infra Part II.F for a detailed analysis of the State’s less than persuasive
case against Fenner.
6
Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269, 282–83.
7
Reporter’s Official Transcript of Proceedings (Sentencing) at 60, Fenner II, No.
01-28360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County May 9, 2002) [hereinafter Sentencing Transcript].
8
The United States Supreme Court has identified certain pretrial stages of a
criminal proceeding where counsel’s presence is required because “the substantial
rights of the accused may be affected.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
569 (3d. ed. 2000). In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967), the Court considered “whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the
particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”
Subsequently in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973), the Court explained
that states must provide counsel for indigent defendants at “trial-like confrontations”
where the lawyer is needed “to act as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the accused.”
Critical stages include judicial proceedings such as formal arraignments, Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970), and confrontations outside the courtroom, such as a post-indictment lineup,
Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
9
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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10

Amendments’ right to counsel. Counsel’s presence was essential to
protect Fenner from making a statement he thought would help to
secure pretrial liberty, but which ultimately jeopardized his right to a
fair trial and resulted in conviction and substantial loss of freedom.
Fenner’s trial attorney, however, did not advance the Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument at the pretrial suppression hearing
11
or upon direct appeal. Following the intermediate appellate court’s
12
affirmance of Fenner’s conviction, his public defender petitioned
the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Court of Appeals) for certiorari
and relied exclusively on Fifth Amendment grounds, namely that the
trial court’s failure to provide Fenner with Miranda advisements and
13
an opportunity to consult with counsel should have excluded his in14
court statement at trial. The defender’s certiorari petition made no
reference to a critical stage right to counsel.
The Court of Appeals certified the Fifth Amendment Miranda is15
sue for review, but rejected Fenner’s contention. Finding that the
judge’s question did not constitute “interrogation,” the court concluded that unrepresented defendants like Fenner were not entitled
to Miranda warnings that included the right to confer with counsel
16
before deciding whether to respond to a judge’s question. It held
17
that Fenner’s rambling explanation represented a “voluntary blurt”
18
that the prosecution may introduce at trial. The Court of Appeals’
10

The Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of
counsel for all cases involving a possible prison sentence in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
11
Because Fenner’s trial defender never raised the Sixth Amendment or statutory right to counsel at the bail stage, he failed to preserve the issue on appeal. MD.
R. 8-131(a). See infra Part IV.A.1.
12
Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 12,
2003). Although the Sixth Amendment issue had not been preserved for appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals ruled sua sponte that bail was not a critical stage entitling
Fenner to representation of counsel. See id. at 10; see also infra Part III.A.
13
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a
person in custody and subject to interrogation must first be informed of the right to
remain silent, that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court,
and of the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during the
questioning.
14
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020
(Md. 2004) (No. 03-406) [hereinafter Fenner Cert. Petition].
15
Fenner also raised a second, non-constitutional issue in his petition. He unsuccessfully argued that the trial court’s admission of a redacted version of his statement rendered it vague and misleading. Id. at 9. The Court of Appeals also certified
this issue for review. See infra note 156.
16
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1034.
17
Id. at 1029 n.10.
18
Id. at 1035.
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ruling negates Fifth Amendment protection for Maryland’s many unrepresented detainees, who speak without counsel at judicial bail
proceedings and who are not informed that their words may be used
as evidence at trial.
But the Fenner court’s ruling went beyond finding a judge’s
courtroom inquiry of an unrepresented and incarcerated defendant
as non-coercive and not triggering Miranda advisements. Unexpectedly, the high court ruled upon and foreclosed the broader Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel to indigent defendants, an issue it
19
had not certified in granting certiorari.
Without the benefit of
briefing by the defense and participation by the legal community, the
Court of Appeals became the first state court of last resort to rule that
indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel does not include
bail proceedings, even where the unrepresented accused’s statement
jeopardized his right to a fair trial. The Fenner court’s constitutional
denial of counsel made no mention of its ruling three years earlier
that recognized an indigent defendant’s statutory right to representa20
tion at the initial appearance stage.
This Article explores what went wrong in Maryland and how to
remedy the problem of suspects appearing and speaking without
21
counsel, a familiar occurrence in state courts nationwide. Because
other courts will likely face the issue of whether to admit bail statements of an unrepresented defendant at trial, this Article urges that
they travel a different path. First, appellate courts must avoid a sua
sponte ruling that denies an accused, and indigent defendants as a
class, the right to be heard and to argue against a sweeping ruling
19

Fenner v. State, 837 A.2d 925 (Md. 2003). See supra note 15 and accompanying

text.
20

McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001) (holding that the Maryland Public
Defender Act requires representation at all stages of a criminal proceeding, including the initial appearance where a judicial officer typically determines pretrial release
or bail). See also MD. R. 4-213, 4-216; see infra Part IV.B. Fenner’s trial counsel had
not raised the statutory argument made in McCarter when moving to suppress his
statement. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
21
Maryland is one of forty-two states that fail to guarantee counsel to indigent
defendants at the bail stage throughout the state. See infra notes 325–28 and accompanying text. Sixteen states fail to provide counsel everywhere within their jurisdiction. See infra note 326 and accompanying text. Twenty-six other states, including
Maryland, provide counsel in only one or two select counties. See infra note 327 and
accompanying text. An accused’s right to counsel at bail has uniform meaning in
only eight states and the District of Columbia. See infra note 325 and accompanying
text; see also Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002) [hereinafter
Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?]; Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon:
The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Colbert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon].
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that denies representation at bail. Second, when ruling on the merits, courts should recognize the critical importance of counsel at a
bail proceeding to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial. A lawyer’s
presence ensures that the attorney, not the accused, responds to a
judge’s general request for bail-related information and shields even
the Mirandized defendant from the dangers of self-representation.
Fenner’s rejection of counsel was not supposed to turn out this
22
way. Over forty years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright, a unanimous
United States Supreme Court took a monumental step toward eliminating the sight of ill-prepared, indigent defendants attempting to
defend their freedom alone when facing felony charges. Reversing
the burglary conviction of Clarence Earl Gideon, an itinerant and
homeless petty criminal, the Court ruled for the first time that in
state felony prosecutions, every indigent defendant has the constitu23
tional right to be defended at trial by a lawyer. In contrast to the
24
Fenner court, the Gideon Court invited and welcomed amicus briefs.
It assigned prominent counsel to advocate on behalf of Gideon’s con25
stitutional claim to counsel.
Gideon’s success had a dramatic impact. It changed state courts’
practice of prosecuting and trying accused felons without a defense
26
lawyer. It led the Court to guarantee counsel to indigent defendants
22

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45. The Supreme Court proudly declared that “[t]he
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.” Id. at 344.
24
In support of Gideon’s claim to counsel, twenty-two states joined a brief submitted by the Attorney General of Massachusetts. Brief for the State Government
Amici Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL 75209. Additionally, the Supreme Court received briefs from the State of Oregon, Brief for the State of Oregon
as Amicus Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL 75207, and from the
American Civil Liberties Union, Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Florida Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962
WL 75208.
25
The Supreme Court assigned Abraham Fortas and Abraham Krash, partners in
the prestigious Washington, D.C. law firm Arnold, Fortas & Porter, to represent Mr.
Gideon. Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal
Justice, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1993) (remarks of Abe Krash, Esq.). Two years later,
Mr. Fortas joined the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice.
26
Gideon’s guarantee of counsel for indigent defendants has not resulted in
States fulfilling their promise of ensuring a lawyer’s “effective assistance” of representation. In many jurisdictions, an accused’s right to legal representation and ability to
mount an adequate defense is severely impaired because of assigned counsel’s unmanageable caseload and limited resources. See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the
Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact On Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988); see also ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice
23
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in the more common misdemeanor case and to recognize the lawyer’s crucial role before trial, when most cases are plea bargained or
27
dismissed. The Supreme Court’s respect for counsel’s presence resulted in extending the constitutional guarantee to pretrial “critical
stages,” where an accused’s confrontation with a law enforcement officer or with the adversarial judicial process required a lawyer’s presence to protect the right to a fair trial and avoid “reduc[ing] the trial
28
itself to a mere formality.”
Gideon and its progeny acknowledged counsel’s pretrial responsibility, but left unanswered a crucial issue that Fenner and arrestees
everywhere face after entering a state’s criminal justice system: will
they have a lawyer to protect against making harmful statements
when first encountering a judge and/or a prosecutor at a bail proceeding? That is, does the constitutional right to counsel translate to
counsel’s representation at a judicial bail determination to ensure
that the accused says nothing to defeat their rights to a fair trial? Or
may a State delay counsel’s entry, as Maryland and most states do, until a future court proceeding and risk transforming the judicial bail
hearing into an evidence gathering procedure?
Stated in constitutional terms, should bail be considered a critical stage of criminal proceedings that requires each state to provide
counsel to protect indigents’ right to a fair trial? The Supreme Court
29
has not answered this question. Nor has it considered whether in
the absence of counsel, a judge must provide Miranda warnings and
tell an unrepresented accused of the right to consult with a lawyer before answering the court’s question. Across the nation, indigent defendants resemble the defenseless Clarence Earl Gideon when they
first appear before judicial officers. Some, like Fenner, speak and argue for personal liberty before trial. Often they make damaging inculpatory statements, which, if admitted, render their eventual consultation with counsel and preparation of a defense “a mere
formality.”

(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/
brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
27
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
28
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)). See supra note 8 for examples of what qualifies as a
“critical stage.”
29
For an argument that an accused’s right to prepare a defense and to regain
pretrial liberty are critical stages that implicate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments’ right to counsel, see Colbert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon, supra note 21, at
35–37, and Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1771–75.
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Fenner illustrates why lawyers must be present at state court bail
proceedings to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial. Absent counsel, custodial defendants, even when given Miranda advisements, are
likely to answer a judge’s broad “anything you want to say?” question
30
in order to regain liberty and risk exposing themselves to conviction
at the initial bail stage. When they do make an incriminating statement, the trial option becomes less realistic and available. Moreover,
31
when a judge’s “routine” and “proper” question yields evidence for
prosecutorial use at trial, the separation between the judiciary’s impartial role and the government’s mission to convict the guilty becomes blurred.
This Article contends that state courts must give immediate attention to counsel’s crucial role at the early bail stage to fully implement Gideon’s “noble ideal” of “assur[ing] fair trials before impartial
32
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”
Had the Court of Appeals (and intermediate Court of Special Appeals) required full briefing and argument, the defense and amicus
parties could have explained the limited procedural due process pro33
tections that exist at state bail hearings.
Maryland’s high court
would have considered the constitutional and statutory right to counsel with a greater appreciation for the plight of the unrepresented de34
tainee whose personal liberty is at stake. It could have then measured the impact of admitting the product of a judge’s broad inquiry
on the accused’s fair trial rights. This Article concludes that full argument would likely have led the Fenner court to recognize the necessity of defense counsel’s presence, advice, and advocacy at a bail proceeding.
Part Two of this Article examines the prosecution of Donald
Fenner, beginning with his arrest and appearance before judicial officers and continuing to trial where, during closing argument, the
prosecution made repeated references to Fenner’s utterance and re30

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Md. 2004).
32
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
33
In the typical Maryland bail hearing, a defendant appears without counsel.
Defendants do not physically appear in a public courtroom. Commissioner hearings
are usually conducted from inside a jail or police precinct. See infra note 48. At the
subsequent bail review, detainees observe the proceeding on a television monitor
from jail. See infra Part II.C. But cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52
(1987) (upholding federal preventive detention proceedings against constitutional
due process challenge after concluding that “extensive safeguards,” including the
rights to counsel, to appear in a public courtroom, and to confront witnesses, are in
place to protect the accused).
34
See discussion of McCarter infra Part IV.B.
31
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lied upon this crucial piece of evidence for conviction. Part Three
analyzes Fenner’s appeal before Maryland appellate courts.
Part Four of this Article considers and critiques the Maryland
Court of Appeals’ sua sponte practice, first in ruling upon a nonpreserved and non-certified constitutional issue that the defense had
36
not briefed, and second, by not discussing McCarter v. State in which
the Court of Appeals determined that indigent defendants have a
statutory right to counsel. Part Four also explains why sua sponte rulings involving broad constitutional and class-based issues are disfavored and should be avoided, barring “most extraordinary” circum37
stances. Part Five examines right to counsel jurisprudence and the
implications of Fenner in Maryland and nationwide. The Article concludes by exploring the possible remedies.
II. THE TRIAL OF DONALD FENNER
A. The Charges
Donald Fenner’s involvement with drugs brought him into regular contact with the criminal justice system. At the time of the instant
arrest, he was thirty-one years old. In his adult life, there had been
“plenty of times” when Fenner remembered being “in front of a
38
39
judge.” Fenner’s acknowledged drug problem resulted in two fel40
ony and one misdemeanor convictions.
In the instant case, Fenner was arrested for selling a gram of
41
crack cocaine worth fifty dollars to a police informant. There was
nothing extraordinary about the arrest, which occurred on the eve42
ning of January 9, 2001. It was a typical police buy-and-bust operation, involving an informant who had been told to purchase crack co35

See Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269, 282–83.
770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001) (holding that the Maryland Public Defender Act requires representation at all stages of a criminal proceeding, including the initial appearance where a judicial officer typically determines pretrial release or bail).
37
See infra note 230.
38
Sentencing Transcript, supra note 7, at 57–58.
39
Id. at 57.
40
See id. at 60. At sentencing, the prosecution sought a mandatory twenty-five
year prison sentence based on Fenner’s two prior felonies for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell and distribution of cocaine. Id. at 4. Fenner’s attorney successfully argued against the mandatory sentence. Id. at 48. In sentencing Fenner to twenty years, the judge noted that this was his third drug
conviction. Id. at 60.
41
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 27. A gram is
equivalent to 1/28 of an ounce.
42
Id. at 17.
36
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caine from a drug dealer and who was promised favorable considera43
tion. Police officers in Maryland had targeted an apartment com44
plex known as a drug area and followed their usual covert operation
procedures. They wired the informant so that they would be able to
listen to his conversation, provided marked money for the transac45
tion, and observed the scene through binoculars.
Seemingly, everything proceeded as planned. According to police, the informant paid Fenner with a marked fifty-dollar bill and re46
ceived three pieces of crack cocaine. Police recovered the marked
47
money from Fenner and the drugs from the informant. Although
no officer observed the actual transaction, police presence at the
scene, combined with recorded conversations and recovered drug
money, corroborated the informant’s account and made the case appear to be a slam-dunk conviction when Fenner appeared before a
Maryland commissioner. However, as explained in the next section,
the prosecution’s case was ultimately weak and tenuous, except for
Fenner’s inculpatory statement.
B. Stage One: Maryland’s Bail Proceedings
Fenner’s commissioner hearing was conducted inside the local
48
Frederick County detention jail. Because the hearing did not take
43

Id. at 18. Frederick City Police Officer Tokars, the controlling investigating
officer, testified that “the operation consisted of the use of a confidential informant
with the direct purpose to purchase a controlled, dangerous substance, in particular
crack cocaine.” Id.
44
Id. (“The general target area was building four of John Hansen Apartments.”).
45
Id. at 19. Officers traveled with the informant to the apartment complex. Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 20.
46
Id. at 25. The informant testified that a second person, the middleman or
steerer, introduced him to Fenner and kept one of the pieces for himself. Id. at 179.
47
Id. at 27 (“[T]he confidential informant handed over to me two rocks of suspected crack cocaine.”). The prosecutor then asked Officer Tokars, “And the $50
was found on Donald Fenner?” Id. The officer answered, “That’s correct.” Id. At
the suppression hearing, the court suppressed the marked money. Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 49–51.
48
DOUGLAS COLBERT, THE PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL SYSTEM 21 n.77 (ABELL FOUND. 2001), available at http://
www.abell.org/pubsitems/hhs_pretrial_9.01.pdf [hereinafter PRETRIAL RELEASE
PROJECT]. Since 1971, Maryland district court commissioners, and then, district
court judges, assume the primary responsibility for deciding pretrial release or incarceration. See supra note 4. District court commissioners, like judges, are judicial officers. Few, however, are lawyers or trained in law. PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT, supra,
at 20 n.75. Commissioners exercise a very important role in deciding which detainees are freed and who requires bail pending trial. Md. R. 4-213. Most district court
judges maintain the commissioner’s bail amount when they review a commissioner’s
decision the following court day even though commissioners render their crucial first
decision with limited information. PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT, supra, at 20 & n.76,
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place in a public courtroom, no family or friends could attend. Like
most defendants, Fenner had no public defender. In Maryland, indigent defendants are left to speak to the commissioner on their own
behalf. They are not given Miranda advisements.
Fenner probably would have welcomed a lawyer. Despite his
49
limited education and verbal skills, he could anticipate that his
criminal record would hinder his chance for release on recognizance.
But Fenner could not have prepared for how poorly he would fare
before the commissioner. The commissioner set bail at $150,000 for
50
a fifty-dollar drug sale. Since hearings are not recorded, one cannot
be certain what the alleged justification was for such a decision. Perhaps the commissioner concluded that Fenner’s prior convictions,
51
other arrests, and missed court appearances warranted high bail.
Yet it is difficult to reconcile the extraordinary amount set with the
constitutional and statutory requirement of ordering non-excessive
52
bail. One thing was clear: Fenner could not afford it. Unless he
could convince the bail review judge to lower bail considerably, Fen53
ner would remain in jail until his next court date, one month later.
C. Stage Two: The Bail Review Court
Later that same day, Fenner appeared at a bail review hearing.
Neither the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Court of Special Appeals) nor the Court of Appeals described the circumstances in which
Fenner’s bail review proceeding was held. Nor did his appellate defender provide a picture of what Fenner experienced when he appeared unrepresented before the district court judge. Similar to
many Maryland counties, Frederick County conducts bail review proceedings by video broadcast. Defendants are not brought to a court21–22. They lack a pretrial investigative report to verify an accused’s family, employment, and community ties, and rarely see or hear from a defense attorney. Id. at
23–25. Hearings are often closed to the public and are typically conducted inside a
jail or police precinct. Id. at 21. Proceedings are not recorded or transcribed.
49
While in jail, Fenner was working towards a GED. Sentencing Transcript, supra
note 7, at 57.
50
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 54.
51
Sentencing Transcript, supra note 7, at 4–10.
52
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 25. In the author’s experience, judicial officers reserve
bails of $150,000 for someone charged as a major drug dealer, not for someone like
Fenner who, when arrested, had no drugs on his person and no money, aside from a
marked fifty-dollar bill a police informant allegedly paid him. See Motion to Suppress
and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 27, 35.
53
Fenner appeared before the commissioner on January 10, 2001. Fenner v.
State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Md. 2004). His preliminary hearing was
scheduled for February 8, 2001. Id.
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room, but remain in jail and view proceedings on television. Fenner
saw and heard a judge speaking and was aware of an assistant state
54
prosecuting attorney’s presence. One person Fenner knew was not
there was his public defender. In Frederick County, as in most other
places in the state, public defenders are not present to advocate or
55
advise indigent clients at bail reviews.
The hearing transcript indicated that the District Court judge
never explained bail procedures to Fenner or informed him what information he considered relevant in reviewing the commissioner’s
ruling. Nor did the judge warn Fenner that anything said might be
used against him at trial. No pretrial representative was present to
report on the importance of Fenner’s personal background and
community ties, and the judge did not ask specific questions about
his family, employment, or ability to afford bail. At no time during
the abbreviated hearing did the court inquire why the commissioner
had set bail at $150,000. Instead, the judge’s first words informed
Fenner that a preliminary hearing had been scheduled. The judge
then posed the following open-ended question:
Sir, [regarding] your attempt through a guardian to have a preliminary hearing, we have requested a preliminary hearing which
is now scheduled for February the 8th. Is there anything you’d like to
56
tell me about yourself, sir?

Maryland appellate courts later indicated that they understood
the judge’s general invitation to speak about “anything” to exclude

54

The Public Defender’s appellate brief included the preliminary dialogue between the bail review judge and the prosecutor at the start of the bail hearing, which
was, at times, incomprehensible.
THE COURT: . . . the whether that time (indiscernible) to amount to
this history of failure to appear the State hasn’t let his bond of
$150,000 would be secured as such.
PROSECUTOR: Thank you
THE COURT: Sir, your attempt through a guardian to have a preliminary hearing, we have requested a preliminary hearing which is now
scheduled for February the 8th. Is there anything you’d like to tell me
about yourself, sir?
Appellant’s Brief at 5, Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Filed Aug. 12, 2003). Fenner proceeded with his rambling statement. See infra note
58 and accompanying text.
55
Like many states, Maryland guarantees legal representation at a bail review
hearing in a minority of counties. At the time of Fenner’s bail review, only Baltimore, Harford, and Montgomery County public defenders represented indigent defendants at bail review hearings. In the remaining nine Maryland judicial districts,
defendants were unrepresented at bail review hearings. See Colbert, Do Attorneys
Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–27, 1732 n.57.
56
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 3 (emphasis added).
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reference to the specific crime.
But the court rulings never explained why they were confident that Fenner knew not to speak about
the charge or what he could be expected to understand about the legal significance of the judge’s words at a bail determination. Most
lawyers would have been baffled by the judge’s reference to a guardian in a criminal case, who apparently recommended that Fenner ask
for a preliminary hearing. While Fenner too may not have understood, he surely comprehended the high stakes of the proceeding.
He heard the judge say his next court date was scheduled for February 8, almost one month later, and realized the judge’s bail review
decision would determine whether or not he remained incarcerated
until then. But what should he say? How was Fenner to make sense
of the judge’s preliminary information and connect it to answering
his question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself?”
The court transcript captured most of Fenner’s rambling response:
For all the yes, activities, I don’t, I don’t know what you’re talking about over there. (Indiscernible.) I ain’t gonna, I mean I
gonna (indiscernible.) I can’t get no help on that, you know, they
try to give you help. That’s all they going to do is call and put me
in jail and (indiscernible). I ain’t playing it with the big boy,
know what I’m sayin’. (Indiscernible), Officer, what else is there
for me to do? Whenever I get, whenever I get caught with a little
charge they never catch a large amount of drugs on me so, according to the amount of (indiscernible) drug (indiscernible),
you know what I’m saying, I mean (indiscernible) so I think like
they just (indiscernible). Whenever they catch, they probably
catch me with one or two pills, Your Honor, this is just for me to
make ends meet, to make money for me to be able to get by.
They never caught me that (indiscernible) amount of drugs on
me. You know what I’m sayin’. I mean I’m not denying what happened but when they caught me, they didn’t catch me with nothing
but that $50.
THE COURT: Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you
58
can.

Absent counsel there was no one to protect Fenner from his own
59
nearly incoherent and unfocused statement. Was his limited ability
57

Id. at 9; see infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text (describing and critiquing the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals). See also Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1029;
see infra notes 163–76 and accompanying text (examining the Court of Appeals’ ruling).
58
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1023–24.
59
At times, Fenner’s speech was incomprehensible and the trial judge who decided the suppression issue indicated he had difficulty understanding the tape itself.
See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 51, 53.
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to articulate connected to his level of education and intellectual ability, or to his uncertainty about how to reply to the judge? Was he the
“ignorant, illiterate or person of feeble intellect” the Supreme Court
identified long ago as being in particular need of counsel’s “guiding
60
hand”? Was Fenner sober and sufficiently alert and capable to make
a voluntary statement? Or was he merely acting as the anxious, unrepresented defendant who was alone and unsure of what to say?
The judge never inquired and the record is silent. But after hearing
Fenner attempt to gain the court’s sympathy, one fact remained
clear: the District Court judge knew Fenner needed an attorney.
D. Admissibility of Evidence: The Suppression Hearing
One year later, as Fenner’s case gradually moved toward trial, his
public defender challenged the arrest’s legality. In a pretrial hearing,
the defender sought exclusion of evidence he claimed had been
unlawfully obtained, namely his client’s statement and the fifty dollars
61
the police asserted they recovered. At the suppression hearing, the
defender convinced the judge that the police lacked probable cause
to arrest. The judge suppressed the marked money, but not Fenner’s
62
admission at the bail review hearing.
The judge’s suppression order followed testimony in which not a
single police witness testified to observing a drug transaction involv63
ing Fenner or anyone else for that matter. Indeed only one of the
five officers who constituted the “back-up” team had even seen Fenner before his arrest. This lone officer observed Fenner standing
alone near a building when the informant and a “middleman” named
King approached. According to the officer, Fenner, the informant,
and King “appeared” to engage in a brief conversation before enter64
ing the building. Though the police recorded the ensuing conver60

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (“[The accused] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. . . . If that be true
of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect.”).
61
See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 12–16.
62
Id. at 50–51, 67–70.
63
See id. at 29. The defense attorney asked Officer Tokars: “Officer Tokars you
never observed any transaction . . . .” Id. The officer replied, “That’s correct.” Id.
Tokars then added: “To my knowledge, I would say nobody saw the transaction.” Id.
64
Police Officer Stocksdale observed the informant and a second man walk to
the building complex where they met “up with another subject who was later identified as Donald Anseld Fenner . . . . At that time [he] observed them all appear to be
speaking together. . . . [and then] observed them all walk into the north entrance of
building number four.” Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at
39. The officer did not testify to hearing the actual words spoken.
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sation, no officer identified Fenner as one of the persons heard
speaking.
Without a police witness or recorded conversation to confirm
Fenner’s participation during the claimed drug transaction, and
without the marked money, the prosecution’s case rested heavily on
the credibility of the informant and King, who also was separately
65
charged and arrested. While the informant and King pointed to
Fenner as the seller, their accounts of the events made both of them
vulnerable to cross-examination. Each had pending criminal charges
66
for which they sought leniency. Both acknowledged using drugs to67
gether.
The prosecutor thus had great incentive to vigorously oppose
the defense effort to suppress Fenner’s words at his bail review hearing. From the prosecutor’s perspective, Fenner’s admission was extremely valuable. After all, what evidence of guilt impresses a jury
more than hearing the defendant admit soon after arrest: “I’m not
denying what happened.” The defense, however, viewed admissibility
as the State taking advantage of an unrepresented defendant, willing
to say what was necessary to obtain an affordable bail and avoid extended pretrial incarceration. What had begun as the nondescript,
run-of-the-mill drug prosecution now posed a direct challenge to
whether the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination protected an accused at the bail stage.
E. The Defendant’s Unsuccessful Fifth Amendment
Suppression Argument
The trial judge considered the legal arguments. Fenner’s defender focused on asserting that his client’s Fifth and Fourteenth
65

John Walter King, also known as Humpty, was charged with several crimes related to the drug transaction, including conspiracy to distribute and possession of
drug paraphernalia, namely a crack pipe. Id. at 25–28; Trial II Transcript, supra note
5, at 189–91, 194.
66
The informant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was
awaiting sentencing. Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 147.
He also faced a violation of probation charge. Id. at 171–72. For his involvement in
the instant transaction, middleman King entered a plea arrangement with the prosecutor in which he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and the remaining charges
were dismissed. Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 196. King also faced a violation
of probation charge when he testified. Id. Both the informant and King had prior
criminal convictions. Id. at 194–96; Motion to Suppress and Trial 1 Transcript, supra
note 2, at 170.
67
The informant stated: “I used drugs with Humpty before. . . . he’s a user.”
Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 150–51. King added that when he and the informant used drugs together, they would take turns purchasing the drugs. Id. at 200–
02.
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Amendment rights were violated. He argued that Fenner could not
waive his privilege against self incrimination without Miranda warnings and the opportunity to consult with counsel. Because Fenner
had been unrepresented and was in custody when the Judge posed
his general “tell me about yourself” question, his defender argued
that Fenner had been in a custodial interrogation and was entitled to
68
Miranda advisements.
Fenner’s trial counsel distinguished his client’s situation from
69
the unrepresented defendant in Schmidt v. State, where the Court of
Special Appeals upheld the admissibility of an accused’s statement at
a bail hearing. While both Schmidt and Fenner had spoken without
consulting a lawyer, Schmidt had been “Mirandized” and informed
70
about the consequence of speaking. The unrepresented Fenner,
argued the defender, never received his constitutional warnings. In
such a situation, he contended, Schmidt commanded suppression.
At the suppression hearing, the trial defender relied exclusively
on the Fifth Amendment argument and never asserted Fenner’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at bail. Nor did he contend Fenner had
a statutory right to representation, based upon a recent unanimous
Court of Appeals finding that the public defender’s duty extended to
71
all stages of a criminal proceeding. The defender also declined to
challenge admissibility on due process grounds, by suggesting Fenner’s mental limitations or state of mind supported the involuntari72
ness and coercive nature of his statement to the court. Failure to
preserve these issues for appeal would limit Fenner’s appellate strat73
egy.
The trial judge then considered the prosecutor’s argument and
reliance on Schmidt v. State. The prosecutor contended that Fenner’s
bail review judge, like Schmidt’s, had asked a “routine” question that
68

Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 60.
481 A.2d 241 (Md. 1984). Fenner’s defender mistakenly argued that Schmidt
had been represented by counsel. See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 60. Schmidt appeared alone at his bail hearing. Schmidt, 481 A.2d at
244.
70
In Schmidt, the appellate court rejected the defense contention that any inculpatory statement at a bail hearing should be excluded under any circumstance.
Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 245. Police officers informed Schmidt of his Miranda rights. Id.
at 244.
71
McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195, 201 (Md. 2001); see infra Part IV.B.
72
Fenner’s lawyer, however, contended that his client’s statements were vague
and irrelevant. See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 58.
Additionally, he argued briefly that the statements should be suppressed as fruits of
the poisonous tree. Id. at 66.
73
See infra Part III.
69
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was “unrelated to evidence gathering or prosecution.” Such a judicial inquiry, he contended, was not an “interrogation” requiring
75
Miranda warnings. Consequently, the prosecutor argued, the trial
court should conclude that Fenner had no Fifth Amendment privi76
lege to assert, much less waive. The judge agreed. He declared that
“there’s nothing inherently improper about [admitting] that state77
ment based on the Miranda case . . . .” The judge redacted most of
Fenner’s comments, but indicated he would permit the portion in
78
which the defendant said, “I’m not denying what happened.” When
both sides objected to the abbreviated statement, the judge “convened a chambers conference in an effort to have the parties craft an
79
appropriate stipulation.” Thereafter, the defender stipulated that
the prosecutor could present evidence to a jury that Fenner said, “I’m
80
not denying what happened.” Defense counsel preserved the redac81
tion issue for appeal.
After ruling, the trial judge made a surprising reference to Fenner’s mental capacity. “I’ve treated Mr. Fenner as an adult when I’ve
talked to him here in Court, I think any judge [would] and as long as
we don’t believe someone’s incompetent [sic] is proper in treating
82
someone as an adult . . . .”
Reading these comments one wonders
what led the judge to refer to Fenner’s competence. Had he reason
to wonder about Fenner’s mental capability during the hearing?
Perhaps he overheard Fenner speaking to his attorney and appearing
83
to lack comprehension of the proceeding’s nature. Had the judge
74

Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 63.
Id. at 64.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 69. The trial judge ruled that Schmidt provided “clear guidance.” Id. at
68. He believed that Fenner’s case was “simpler” since “the [bail review] Judge was
trying to elicit information about Mr. Fenner personally, . . . [and] not trying to investigate the case itself.” Id. at 68. The judge continued: “It was custodial but it
wasn’t interrogation in the context of Miranda warnings.” Motion to Suppress and
Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 68.
78
Id. at 71.
79
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Md. 2004).
80
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 78. The stipulation
also provided that a jury would be told that Fenner had no lawyer when he made his
remarks. Id. At trial, this information was excluded from the stipulation read to the
jury. Id. at 245.
81
The defender stated: “I want to go on the record though and say that by my
agreeing to that stipulation that I’m, that doesn’t mean I’m accepting the Court’s
decision in that matter . . . . I’m not agreeing that that’s a correct decision.” Id. at 79.
82
Id. at 69.
83
The following brief exchange occurred at the suppression hearing between
Fenner and his defender before the State called a police officer to testify:
75
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considered Fenner’s confusing bail statements as the product of
someone with limited understanding? Fenner never testified or presented an expert witness to support the claim that he did not speak
voluntarily when he responded to the bail judge’s question. Ultimately, the trial judge’s suppression order sanitized Fenner’s inco84
herent ramblings by eliminating most of the prejudicial remarks.
Thereafter, neither his counsel nor anyone else raised the issue of
Fenner’s mental state again at trial or before an appellate court.
F.

The Trial Evidence of Guilt

At trial, the government presented the prosecution of Donald
85
Fenner as a “real straight forward textbook type of case.” In his
opening statement, the prosecutor built the foundation upon police
86
testimony from members of the “drug enforcement unit.” Police
witnesses, he said, would describe the arrangement with their confidential informant and would testify to their presence at important
87
moments in the events leading to Fenner’s arrest. The recorded
tape conversation would provide jurors with a glimpse into the drug
88
world. Both the police and the tape would bolster the informant’s
89
and the middleman’s account.

MR. FENNER: How they got me charged (indiscernible). What would
be the (indiscernible)?
MR. HARRIS: Well see these, yeah, we’re going to pick the jury today.
MR. FENNER: All right.
Id. at 16.
Following the officer’s testimony, Fenner again seemed less than clear in responding to his counsel:
MR. FENNER: Do I leave this right here?
MR. HARRIS: Yeah, you can leave this here. As I explained to you,
these are lesser, this is a lesser included offense. They can charge you
like that.
MR. FENNER: All right, no because, you know, this thing telling me
they can’t do it. I mean, I mean, I know what you’re saying.
MR. HARRIS: Okay.
MR. FENNER: I’m just (indiscernible).
(Brief recess)
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 37.
84
The trial judge considered the defendant’s remarks excludable because they
referred to evidence of “other crimes.” Id. at 69–70.
85
Id. at 92.
86
Id. at 92–93.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 93–96 (describing the testimony of the informants and contents of the
recorded taped conversation).
89
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 93–96.
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No matter how much the prosecutor focused jury attention on
the police, however, he knew his case ultimately depended upon jurors believing these two individuals of questionable credibility—one
seeking dismissal of pending charges, the other looking to avoid pun90
ishment for violating probation. They were the only witnesses who
would testify that Fenner sold drugs. Only they could confirm it was
Fenner’s voice on the police tape. To convict, the jury would have to
accept their testimony. The prosecutor looked for corroboration.
Fenner’s admission fit perfectly.
For the defense, there were many places to identify reasonable
doubt and to persuade a jury to acquit. Cross examination, said defense counsel, would establish that the police did not see anything
that may have occurred inside the building when the transaction
91
supposedly occurred. The prosecutor provided no officer who observed a drug sale or who observed Fenner engage in drug selling ac92
tivity outside the building. No one testified to seeing Fenner speak
to passersby (before the informant and middleman approached), or
exchange money for drugs, or enter and quickly leave the building
93
on other occasions. No officer could state that Fenner even had a
94
connection to the building. Before this arrest, he was an unknown,
unlike the informant and middleman, who were familiar to each
95
other (and to the police) from the drug trade. Moreover, no police
witness would identify Fenner’s voice on the police tape. And as a result of the suppression ruling, no officer testified that Fenner pos96
sessed marked money.
Fenner’s first trial ended abruptly when a discovery violation
97
prompted the court to grant the defendant’s motion for mistrial. At
Fenner’s second trial, the prosecution’s “textbook” theory remained
largely intact. The prosecutor delivered a similar opening state98
ment. He told the jury what they would be hearing from police wit90

See supra notes 65–67.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
92
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. See also Trial II Transcript, supra
note 5, at 276–78 (arguing, in closing, that without the testimony of the informant
and King, the State had no case).
93
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying test.
94
Id.
95
See supra notes 64–67.
96
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
97
At Fenner’s first trial, the informant improperly testified to statements Fenner
allegedly made after the drug transaction that the State failed to disclose during discovery. Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 185–90.
98
The prosecutor began by saying: “I wish I could present to you some big case
you see on TV, you know lots of fun stuff and whatnot, but quite frankly what I’m go91
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nesses and “middleman” King, who would support the informant’s
99
account. The prosecutor referred to other officers who would tes100
tify. He never mentioned Fenner’s stipulated statement—“I’m not
denying what happened.” Instead he asked that they “listen to all
that evidence [and after you do] I will give a closing argument where
101
I ask you to convict Mr. Fenner.”
The defense opening rejected the prosecution’s “routine and
102
straight forward theory.” It highlighted the police failure to observe
103
a drug transaction inside the building.
Fenner’s defender urged
the jury to examine closely the credibility of the informant and mid104
dleman and to consider their motivation to testify untruthfully.
The trial proceeded with few surprises. The prosecution ultimately did not introduce the recorded conversation, but its three police and two lay witnesses conveyed the important details of the drug
105
transaction.
The prosecution concluded its’ case-in-chief by intro106
The defense called no witducing Fenner’s stipulated statement.
nesses and relied on cross examination to establish its’ reasonable
doubt defense. When both sides rested, each attorney and the trial
judge had reason to believe the outcome was in doubt.
G. Closing Argument: Fenner’s Words Echo Through the Courtroom
This was one of the trials where closing argument took on added
107
importance in the jury’s deliberation.
The prosecutor spoke first
and last as part of Maryland’s “sandwich” closing procedures. Preing to be presenting to you today is really just a real straight forward case.” Trial II
Transcript, supra note 5, at 88.
99
Id. at 88–94. At Fenner’s first trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement had not
mentioned King as a State witness. See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 92–97.
100
The prosecution called Officer Stocksdale to testify to seeing the informant
and middleman approach the defendant, apparently converse, and then enter and
leave the building. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. He also called Sergeant Yingling who placed the confidential informant under arrest. Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 223–24.
101
Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 92.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 93.
104
Id. at 95–96.
105
At trial, the informant testified that the defendant offered his pager number
following the drug transaction. Id. at 163. A jury could have inferred Fenner was a
drug dealer who was interested in more business. At Fenner’s first trial, the informant’s testimony caused a mistrial. See supra note 97.
106
Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269.
107
See Anemona Hartocollis, In Summation, Power to Win Jury’s Favor: Last Chance to
Tip Scales May Rest on a Wry Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at B1.
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dictably, the prosecutor reviewed the testimony of each witness—the
officers, the informant, and the middleman King, suggesting each
testified honestly and truthfully. “We have every, every piece to the
108
puzzle. . . . [T]here are no pieces of the puzzle missing.”
But the
prosecutor must have realized that a juror could have found the lack
of police eyewitness testimony and physical evidence less than convincing. Seemingly ready to conclude his summation, the prosecutor
offered the final piece of evidence: Donald Fenner’s own words. The
prosecutor returned several times to Fenner’s admissions:
[O]h I almost forgot about the stipulation when Donald Fenner
appeared before the judge at the bail hearing he says, I’m not denying what happened. So we have every piece of the puzzle. I mean
there’s no piece missing here. Okay, I’m not denying what happened
because it did happen. Okay?
So did he sell, transfer, exchange a substance that was cocaine?
Absolutely, folks, absolutely. And did he conspire? Absolutely,
109
I’m not denying what happened.

Moments later, the defense answered most of the prosecutor’s
arguments. Fenner’s defender cast doubt upon the credibility of the
110
informant and the middleman.
He emphasized the limitations of
111
the police observations. But the defender had no response to Fenner’s admission. He rested without offering an explanation for Fenner’s incriminating statement.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor concentrated on proving Fenner’s
guilt through his own words. Discarding the “textbook” theme, the
prosecutor powerfully pled for the jury to believe the informant and
middleman: no one, not even the defendant, denied he had sold the
drugs:
The Defendant’s not denying what happened, [middleman]
Mr. King’s not denying what happened, [informant] Mr. Hann’s
not denying what happened. What happened was Donald Fenner
was dealing drugs in Hansen and he got caught. That’s what hap112
pened.

The prosecutor then concluded by repeating the “what happened”
theme over and over:
Once again folks, Mr. King’s not denying what happened, Mr.
Hann’s not denying what happen[ed], Officer Tokarz isn’t deny-

108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 268.
Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
Id. at 274–76.
Id. at 276–78.
Id. at 282.
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ing what happened, Officer Stockdale’s not denying what happened. The Defendant at a bail hearing, I’m not denying what
happened. No one on this jury should deny what happened that
evening. And what happened on that evening is Donald Fenner
113
was distributing drugs and he conspired.

While one cannot know for certain what evidence or argument
persuades a jury to reach a verdict, it is clear that the prosecutor built
a powerful closing based upon Fenner’s statement at his bail review
hearing. Hearing the prosecuting attorney make fourteen specific
references to the “everyone knows what happened” theme within
such a brief time period could not be easily ignored. Jurors had to
consider that it was the accused who admitted his guilt when he said,
“I’m not denying what happened.” Such evidence was crucial to the
State’s proof.
Fenner was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison for
114
his role as the seller in a fifty dollar drug transaction. His statement
at a bail hearing, made without counsel present, may have been the
decisive piece of evidence. Should his statement have been admitted
at trial? Fenner’s trial counsel had preserved only the Fifth Amendment Miranda question for appellate review and had not argued the
Sixth Amendment issue that bail is a critical stage to the suppression
115
judge.
But in affirming the judge’s refusal to suppress evidence,
Maryland’s appellate courts demonstrated an unusual eagerness to
decide the broader Sixth Amendment right to an advocate at bail.
III. FENNER’S APPEAL
Fenner’s trial counsel vigorously, but unsuccessfully, asserted
that his client’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination
precluded admission of his statement uttered without consultation
with a lawyer and without being advised of either his right to remain
116
silent or the consequences of speaking.
On appeal, Fenner’s defender followed a similar Fifth Amendment line of argument that
Maryland’s intermediate appellate Court of Special Appeals also rejected. In affirming the statement’s admissibility, however, the Court
of Special Appeals rejected Fenner’s Sixth Amendment right to coun117
sel, an issue that Fenner’s defender had not raised or briefed.
As
discussed below, the Court of Special Appeals’ sua sponte ruling set
113
114
115
116
117

Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 283.
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Md. 2004).
See supra note 11.
See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 57–60, 66–67.
See infra notes 183–86.
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the stage for Maryland’s highest court to engage in the same pattern
of judicial activism and decide a constitutional issue it had not certified for review and as to which it had not invited or considered argument from the defense or outside legal community.
A. The Intermediate Appellate Court Rejects Fenner’s Fifth Amendment
Claim and Issues a Sua Sponte Sixth Amendment Ruling
After conviction, Fenner’s public defender directly appealed to
118
the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported decision, the court
affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to suppress his bail hearing statement and affirmed his conviction. Fenner’s appellate defender, like
his trial counsel, argued for suppression on Fifth Amendment
grounds. He contended that Fenner’s in-court statement should
have been excluded because it had been inadmissibly “obtained in
119
violation of [his right to counsel within the meaning of] Miranda.”
The defender relied on Schmidt’s reasoning: “If an accused who is represented by counsel and who is made aware of his fifth amendment right volunteers a statement deemed helpful to his position at a bail hearing,
there is no logical reason why that statement could not be used
120
against him at trial.” Fenner’s appellate defender argued the converse follows: if counsel’s presence and an accused’s knowing waiver
protected a defendant’s privilege against self incrimination, then
statements obtained from an unrepresented defendant who had not
121
been given Miranda advisements should be inadmissible.
At no
time did the defender claim Fenner had an independent Sixth
122
Amendment constitutional right, or a statutory entitlement, to
123
counsel at the bail stage.
118

Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 12,
2003).
119
Id. at 5 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The Court of Special
Appeals summarized the defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument. “Appellant contends that his statement should have been suppressed because he was not represented by counsel at the hearing. He also claims that the statement was obtained in
violation of Miranda . . . .” Id. See Appellant’s Brief at 9–12, Fenner III, No. 02-706.
Fenner raised two other grounds on appeal. He contended that the trial court’s jury
instruction on conspiracy was improper and that the court should have instructed on
the law pertaining to an accused’s “mere presence” at a crime scene. Fenner III, No.
02-706, slip op. at 1. This Article focuses exclusively on the court’s sua sponte denial
of counsel and its Fifth Amendment ruling.
120
Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241, 245 (Md. 1984) (emphasis added).
121
See Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Fenner III, No. 02-706.
122
In McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001), the defendant first appeared before a district court judge, not a commissioner, after receiving a summons for which
he had not been taken into custody. The Court of Appeals held that the Maryland
Public Defender Act requires representation of indigent defendants at “all” stages of
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The Court of Special Appeals found little merit to Fenner’s
Fifth Amendment suppression argument. The appellate court saw no
distinction between Fenner being uninformed about his Miranda
rights and Schmidt having been provided Miranda advisements, albeit
124
from the arresting officer and not the bail judge.
The Court of
Special Appeals focused instead on whether Fenner had been in “cus125
todial interrogation,” thus triggering Miranda, when he answered
the judge’s open-ended question. The three-judge court conceded
that the incarcerated Fenner had been in custody, but concluded that
126
the bail judge’s question had not been an interrogation.
The
judges appeared perplexed that a colleague’s courtroom inquiry
could be considered to have occurred within an “inherently compul127
sive atmosphere” or be compared to police questioning. From the
appellate judges’ perspective, a courtroom is unlike the coercive police station setting. Rather, a courtroom is a venue where “there are
128
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.”
The appellate court viewed the bail judge’s “routine questioning . . .
unrelated to evidence gathering and prosecution . . . [and] general
129
in nature rather than specifically related to any criminal offense.”
Fenner’s bail judge said the Court of Special Appeals had “merely
asked . . . if there was anything he would like to tell him about him130
self.” The court found the judge’s question “proper . . . in deter-

a criminal proceeding, including the initial appearance. See infra Part IV.B. McCarter
would have supported Fenner’s claim to a statutory right to counsel at the initial appearance before a commissioner and, subsequently, to a bail review before a district
court judge. See infra notes 287–95 and accompanying text.
123
Fenner’s appellate defender likely was familiar with Maryland’s strict rule of
preservation, Md. R. 8-131(a), see infra note 215, and was aware that Fenner’s trial defender had not raised the right to counsel argument during the suppression hearing
or trial. See supra Part II.E. The appellate defender never questioned whether his
colleague’s failure to raise the right to counsel argument required the assignment of
independent counsel to avoid a potential conflict between trial and appellate counsel, a typical situation in public defender offices for attorneys who share the same client and employer.
124
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 7–9.
125
Id. at 6.
126
Id. at 9.
127
Id. at 7. The intermediate appellate court concluded, without further explanation, that “the Miranda court did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogations as equivalent.” Id. at 8 (citing Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.
1984) (citations omitted)).
128
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
129
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 7 (quoting Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247).
130
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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mining an appropriate amount of bail.” It concluded that Fenner
132
had not been subject to a custodial interrogation and was not entitled to Miranda advisements.
The Court of Special Appeals presented an incomplete and misleading picture of Fenner’s predicament. Overlooking the jailed circumstances in which Fenner appeared without counsel with bail of
133
$150,000, the court declined to place itself in Fenner’s situation
and see the judicial bail review as his only opportunity to speak and
avoid further lengthy incarceration until trial. From its vantage
point, the appellate court appeared to picture a courtroom bail pro134
ceeding where Fenner “was brought before a District Court judge,”
where “impartial observers” were present, and where the judge’s benign question was not “intended to elicit any information about a
specific criminal offense” or even “reasonably likely to elicit [from
135
Fenner] an incriminating response.” The appellate court was con-

131

Id. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with its conclusion in Schmidt v. State
that the bail judge’s question about whether the defendant knew the alleged rape
victim was “unrelated to evidence gathering and prosecution.” Id. at 7 (quoting
Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247). Both the Fenner and Schmidt appellate panels understood
“the purpose of the question was to enable the judge to set an appropriate amount of
bail, not to secure information for the prosecution.” Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247.
Whatever the judge’s conscious purpose, admitting Fenner’s statement considerably
strengthened the prosecution’s case against Fenner.
132
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9.
133
The record did not describe the “totality of the circumstances” which led to
Fenner’s inculpatory remark before the district court bail judge, including the period he spent in pretrial detention prior to the hearing, the denial of counsel and
circumstances of the commissioner proceeding, the jail setting where the public
could not attend, and the impact of facing an unaffordable bail. Commissioner
hearings are not recorded or transcribed. See Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 11
n.4, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (No. 88).
134
Comparing Fenner’s situation to the circumstances it had considered in deciding Schmidt, the Court of Special Appeals emphasized that Schmidt appeared “in a
courtroom” when he made his statement, not “the police station . . . .” Fenner III, No.
02-706, slip op. at 7. The Court of Special Appeals made no mention of Fenner remaining in jail when he viewed the proceedings through a television monitor. See
supra Part II.C.
135
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980)). In Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132 (Md. 1997), the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the “knows or should know” standard when judging a police officer’s
interaction with a defendant. Id. at 140. “[C]ourts should carefully scrutinize the
factual setting of each encounter of this type . . . keeping in mind that the critical
inquiry is whether the police officer, based on the totality of the circumstances, knew
or should have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. (citing United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (6th Cir.
1983). In considering the bail review judge’s question to Fenner, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the notion that the judge’s inquiry would generate a response
such as the instant one. Predictably, Fenner sought to mitigate the seriousness of the
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vinced Fenner knew, or should have known, not to say anything
about the crime or attempt to mitigate culpability.
Fenner’s reality, though, was drastically different. He never
physically entered a public courtroom where he might have found as136
sistance. Looking at a television monitor from his jail cell, Fenner
137
saw only a judge and prosecuting attorney.
No defender was present to counter the intimidating jail courtroom surroundings or to
advise Fenner how to respond or explain the “intricacies of substan138
tive and procedural criminal law” related to a bail determination.
Like most unrepresented and incarcerated pretrial detainees,
Fenner was isolated. From his perspective, the judge’s open-ended
question provided no guidance, no explanation, and no specifics
about what information the court considered pertinent to a bail reduction. To the contrary, the judge’s inquiry unwittingly set a verbal
trap for the captive Fenner, who could easily have translated the
court’s words to mean, “Answer my question and I will consider reducing your bail. Do not speak and you will stay in jail until trial.
You decide what to say. Do not look to me for guidance.”
Perhaps out of respect for the court’s presumed impartiality or
because he thought he had no choice but to answer and attempt to
persuade the judge to set an affordable bail, Fenner did what many
would have done in the situation—he spoke. Fenner portrayed himself as a small-time drug user in need of treatment, not an unreasonable strategy for someone seeking to avoid the high bail given to major drug dealers. Fenner had not been warned that his words to the
judge could later become the State’s evidence at his trial. Judges, after all, are presented as neutral arbiters, not as “employee[s] of the
139
State” or extensions of the prosecutor. Still, from inside a jail cell,
Fenner could feel the “inherently compulsive atmosphere” that compelled him to respond to the one person who held the key to his freecrimes charged and show that he was likely to return to court and posed no danger
to the community.
136
Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 10–11.
137
Id. at 11.
138
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In Kirby, the Supreme Court held
that an accused’s constitutional right to counsel attaches at the “initiation of judicial
criminal proceedings, . . . [where] the government has committed itself to prosecute,
. . . [and where] a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law.” Id.; see infra notes 144, 210 and accompanying text.
139
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314 (2004) (declaring that the State of
Washington’s sentencing procedures violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial because facts supporting the sentencing enhancements were
found only by the sentencing judge and were never submitted to a jury).
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dom. The judge may not have intended to take advantage of Fenner’s trust, but by asking a question and not candidly explaining the
consequences of his answer, the court “tricked” Fenner into replying.
The Court of Special Appeals, however, saw it differently. It found
that Fenner had not been subject to interrogation and, therefore, did
140
not have to be informed of Miranda requirements.
The Court of Special Appeals then took a surprising second step.
Although the trial and appellate defenders limited argument to the
Fifth Amendment Miranda issue, the court asserted that Fenner’s
situation implicated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In terse
language, the Court of Special Appeals summarily ruled that the
“[a]ppellant’s contention that he was entitled to counsel at the bail
141
review has no merit.” In fact, Fenner’s appellate defender had not
briefed or argued the right to counsel issue at bail proceedings, either on federal or statutory grounds, because the issue had not been
preserved. Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals decided the
broad Sixth Amendment issue sua sponte, without the defendant’s or
defender community’s participation, a court practice that Maryland’s
highest court would soon embrace. Before examining the Court of
Appeals’ ruling, the next section explains the substantial difference
between an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth
Amendment protection that Miranda provides against selfincrimination during a custodial interrogation.
B. Distinguishing an Accused’s Sixth and Fifth Amendment
Right to Counsel
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide two distinct and inde142
pendent rights to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment right has been
part of our constitutional system for more than 200 years and exists to
maintain the adversarial system’s integrity. While counsel’s guaran143
tee did not extend to indigent defendants until 1963, courts today
recognize that a lawyer is necessary to balance the playing field between the accused and the State at trial and at “critical stages” before
144
trial.
Absent a lawyer at these proceedings, an accused’s ability to

140

Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9.
Id. at 10 (citing Hebron v. State, 281 A.2d 547, 548–50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1971)).
142
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (extending Sixth Amendment
protection to suppress the statements of an unrepresented defendant, whom the police questioned following his initial court appearance where he had sought counsel).
143
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
144
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
141
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obtain a fair trial is jeopardized.
The Supreme Court has recognized that, once adversarial proceedings commence and the State initiates criminal charges, a lawyer is essential to protect the liberty and
146
fair trial right of indigents and “unaided laymen.”
147
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,
calling upon counsel to protect an accused from unfair interrogation
practices, sparked controversy as to whether the Court based its ruling on its general supervisory power over state criminal proceedings,
148
or upon explicit constitutional authority. Miranda requires a questioning state official to inform the accused of the right to confer with
149
counsel before deciding whether to speak. The Fifth Amendment’s
purpose in summoning counsel protects the moral autonomy of a
criminal prosecution by eliminating a coercive influence during a
150
custodial interrogation.
Once an accused invokes Miranda, the
questioning must cease, and it may continue only after a lawyer has
151
spoken to the defendant or upon waiver.
Consequently, an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel’s
courtroom advocacy is considerably broader and more extensive than
the limited Fifth Amendment right to obtain a lawyer’s advice and
counsel to counter questioning by an advantaged state actor. By
definition, Fifth Amendment peril against self-incrimination is triggered whether or not adversarial proceedings have begun. Indeed, a
suspect who invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel typically
does so at a time when charges have not yet been filed and the Sixth

145

Id. at 399 (suppressing statements on Sixth Amendment grounds following defendant’s lower court arraignment). “Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is
entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him . . . .” Id. at 398. See also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264, 274–75 (1980).
146
Henry, 447 U.S. at 291.
147
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
148
Id. at 467. In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court
resolved this conflict by ruling that Miranda is constitutionally based and not a Courtmade rule. Because Miranda is a constitutional ruling, the Court held that Congress
lacks the power to legislate by admitting the voluntary statement of a defendant who
had not been given Miranda advisements.
149
Id. at 444–45.
150
Id. at 445–46
151
Id. at 444–45. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (suppressing statements obtained during police interrogation conducted after defendant requested
counsel); Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (suppressing statements of a defendant following his express desire to exercise his right to remain silent).
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Amendment right has not attached. Conversely, an accused’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered at a “critical” proceeding
following the commencement of a criminal prosecution and contin153
ues to trial.
It may or may not have been preceded by a custodial
interrogation. The significance of a court rejecting an accused’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by considering it part of the Fifth
Amendment Miranda argument, is best understood by analyzing the
Fenner court’s sua sponte denial of a lawyer at bail.
C. The Court of Appeals’ Grant of Certiorari and Sua Sponte Rejection
of the Right to Counsel
1.

The Defender’s Writ of Certiorari

Other than the litigants, no one else in the legal community was
likely aware of the unpublished Fenner appellate opinion or knew of
the Court of Special Appeals’ sweeping ruling. Consequently, very
few people would have reacted to Fenner petitioning the Court of
Appeals to review and reverse the appellate court’s ruling.
Fenner’s petition for certiorari never challenged the Court of
Special Appeals’ sua sponte denial of a poor person’s right to counsel
at a bail hearing. In urging reversal of the lower courts’ refusal to
suppress the incriminating statement, Fenner’s defender relied ex154
clusively on the Fifth Amendment issue. The defender highlighted
that the unrepresented Fenner had been unaware of his privilege
against self-incrimination and had not been warned of the conse155
quence of speaking at his bail hearing. While the defender’s peti156
tion included other issues, he never attempted to translate coun-

152

See generally Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth
Amendment as a Mere “Prophylactic Rule”, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207.
153
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
154
In his petition for certiorari, the defender urged the court to rule whether inculpatory statements made at a bail review hearing by a defendant who is unrepresented by counsel and who is not given any Miranda advisements are admissible
against the defendant at trial. He urged the Court of Appeals to identify under what
“circumstances” such statements should not be admitted at trial. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 10, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (No. 88).
155
Id. at 9.
156
In the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, the public defender argued
that “the trial court’s admission of a redacted version of the statement made at the
bail hearing was error where the redaction rendered the statement vague and misleading.” Id. at 1. He also included a third issue, which the Court of Appeals did not
certify: whether, a “mere presence” instruction is required in a case involving distribution/conspiracy to distribute drugs. Id. at 1, 2, 10–13.
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sel’s absence of Fifth Amendment protection to a separate and
broader Sixth Amendment or statutory right to counsel at bail.
Only a relatively small group of appellate specialists, who follow
157
the Court of Appeals’ website and granting of certiorari, would have
noticed the published order certifying Fenner’s Fifth Amendment is158
sue.
Anyone reading it would have found no indication that the
court intended to reach the issue of whether there is a constitutional
right to counsel at bail.
2.

The Court of Appeals’ Fifth Amendment Ruling

Concentrating on the issues the Court of Appeals certified for
review, the appellate defender’s brief emphasized Fifth Amendment
grounds for suppressing Fenner’s bail statement. Citing supporting
case law, the defender contended that an accused’s inculpatory
statement, made without counsel’s advice and without a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent, should be inadmissible
159
at trial.
The prosecuting Assistant Attorney General responded to
“Fenner’s principal argument . . . that he was denied his rights under
160
Miranda.”
The prosecutor argued that Miranda did not apply to
courtroom bail proceedings, which were “entirely different” from “a
police-dominated coercive environment of incommunicado interro161
gation.”
Fenner’s statements, the appellate prosecutor asserted,
were uttered “in the context of a [non-coercive] public court appear162
ance and innocuous questioning by a judge.”
The Court of Appeals agreed and unanimously rejected Fenner’s
163
Fifth Amendment challenge.
Like the intermediate appellate
court, the high court refused to treat a bail judge’s inquiry as a “cus-

157

Until recently, Maryland’s daily legal newspaper, The Daily Record, provided the
only means for learning about Court of Appeals’ orders granting certiorari. Telephone Interview with Lori McGraw, Clerk, Court of Appeals (June 8, 2005). The
published order included the parties’ names, but did not always indicate the questions certified for review. Id. On February 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals began
publishing grants of certiorari review on its website. Usually the order included the
issues certified. If not, they “would be published soon thereafter.” Id. According to
Court of Appeals clerk Lori McGraw, the court’s home page lacks a link to certiorari
grants. Id. Readers must “keep an eye on it.” Id.
158
The court also certified the redaction issue. Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1022.
159
Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 11–19, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88).
160
Brief of Respondent at 9, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1034.
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todial interrogation” that was conducted in a coercive environment.
Rather than “carefully scrutiniz[ing] the factual setting”—alone, inside a jail and “appearing” in court via a video broadcast—the high
court erroneously visualized Fenner standing before a judge in a pub165
lic, “open court” with impartial observers present.
The court
searched for proof that the bail judge intended to provoke Fenner’s
166
response and found none. The high court refused to consider the
bail judge’s question within the context of a judicial bail proceeding
in which Fenner’s desperation and the bail judge’s power to remand
or release him from jail challenged the meaning of voluntariness and
psychological coercion. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals be167
lieved there was no way the judge “should have known” that his
general question would be “reasonably likely” to prompt the incarcerated Fenner to say something to minimize the charge’s seriousness
168
and regain liberty.
The court concluded there was nothing about
the judge’s inquiry that suggested Fenner was subjected to [a] com169
pelling influence or psychological ploy to speak. It spared the bail
judge from responsibility for Fenner’s rather vague and often disjointed statement, which it considered less a “response” to the judge’s
170
question and “more akin to a voluntary blurt.”
The unanimous Fenner court concluded that “[q]uestions posed
to an arrestee by a judge regarding matters relevant to bail, asked in
the setting of a bail review hearing, do not normally amount to an
‘interrogation’ requiring that the arrestee be again advised of his

164

Id. The Court of Appeals explained that Miranda was limited to custodial interrogations, defined to “mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.”
Id. at 1025.
165
Id. at 1025, 1027.
166
Id. at 1029. “There is absolutely no indication that the District Court judge’s
question was designed to elicit an incriminating statement.” Id. at 1028.
167
“‘[C]ourts should carefully scrutinize the factual setting of each encounter of
this type,’ . . . keeping in mind that the critical inquiry is whether the police officer,
based on the totality of circumstances, knew or should have known that the question
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1025
(citing Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (Md. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 989
(1997)).
168
The court explained: “Just as an arrestee may give what turns out to be an inculpatory response to a routine booking question . . . petitioner gave what turned out
to be an inculpatory response to a routine question posed by the District Court judge
at petitioner’s bail review hearing.” Id.
169
“We hold that nothing in the setting of petitioner’s January 10, 2001 bail review hearing can be said to have coerced him into making his inculpatory statement.” Id. at 1030.
170
Id. at 1029 n.10.
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Miranda rights [by the judge] . . . .” The Court of Appeals found no
difference between the judge asking an open-ended “Tell me about
yourself,” or a specific “Are you working?” question. Both involved
172
“matters relevant to bail.” Each was intended to give the defendant
“a chance to explain . . . any circumstances that may have some bearing on his bail that had not been already covered in the prior ques173
tioning.” Fenner’s bail judge, however, had not engaged in “prior
questioning,” nor explained the “bail” information he was seeking
when he asked, “Tell me about yourself?” It was as though the high
court expected the unrepresented defendant to read the judge’s
mind and know what to say and what not to say.
The Fenner court’s Fifth Amendment ruling and analysis is significant and far reaching. It represents the first time a state’s high
court approved a prosecutor’s use of a bail statement uttered by an
174
unrepresented and uninformed defendant to prove guilt at trial.
Fenner permits Maryland judges to initiate similar exchanges and ask
general, “routine” questions of unrepresented defendants without
175
requiring Miranda advisements.
When the judicial inquiry leads a
defendant to make an incriminating response, the new evidence
176
eases Maryland prosecutors’ burden of proving a defendant’s guilt.
While Fenner’s Fifth Amendment Miranda ruling was startling,
the decision was even more remarkable for its resolution of a constitutional issue the defense had neither preserved for appeal nor
briefed or argued before the court: whether the right to counsel at
bail hearings exists.
171

Id. at 1030. The court found it unnecessary to require that Fenner be Mirandized “again.” Id. The record, however, suggests he had never been advised prior to
the hearing. See supra Part II.E (summarizing the public defender’s suppression argument, which never mentioned that the police advised Fenner of his Miranda rights
and which distinguished Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241 (Md. 1984), where the police
did, in fact, Mirandize the defendant). Though the court found that Miranda was
not constitutionally required, it urged trial judges to warn detainees, “as a matter of
good practice and policy,” that their statements may be used at trial. Fenner IV, 846
A.2d at 1030 n.11.
172
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030.
173
Id. at 1029.
174
Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158 (Del. 1983) (admitting for impeachment purposes
an unrepresented defendant’s statement at a bail proceeding); State v. Patten, 631
A.2d 921 (N.H. 1993) (admitting statements of an unrepresented defendant at bail
who had been given Miranda warnings); People v. North, 439 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
175
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. The court suggested trial courts
should be “extra careful” in questioning detainees and “should focus on questions
relating solely to the pretrial release decision.” Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.11.
176
See Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s Sua Sponte Denial
of the Right to Counsel

Following dismissal of Fenner’s Fifth Amendment claim, the
Court of Appeals would have been expected to move to the only
other issue that it had certified in the defendant’s petition for certio177
rari: the trial judge’s redacted version of Fenner’s statement.
Instead, the court sharply detoured from standard appellate practice by
deciding an uncertified constitutional issue: Fenner’s right to a law178
yer at bail.
The court acknowledged that Fenner’s defender had
not addressed or “clearly frame[d] this issue separately” in his certio179
rari petition, and recognized that “it appears only in the context of
180
the question relating to the Miranda warnings issue.” Indeed, it is
mystifying why the high court—after already denying Fenner’s suppression motion—would contravene conventional practice and decide a separate, unraised issue. Additionally, the ruling of the Court
of Appeals undermined its strong policy of not deciding a constitutional issue when the court can resolve the case on non-constitutional
181
grounds.
As explained below, such a non-constitutional, statutory
basis existed for not sustaining the right-to-counsel ruling of the
182
Court of Special Appeals.
Despite these procedural irregularities, the high court boldly declared, without explanation, that its Fifth Amendment ruling “necessarily leads us to petitioner’s next argument as to why his inculpatory
statement should have been declared inadmissible—his lack of coun183
sel at the bail review hearing.”
Unfortunately, Fenner’s “next ar184
Limited by the trial regument” never materialized in his brief.
cord, the defender’s written argument concentrated on the Fifth

177

See supra note 156.
Md. Rule 8-131(b) provides that if a higher court addresses an issue not raised
or decided in the lower court, ordinarily the issue must have been raised in the petition for writ of certiorari.
179
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.12. “The question in petitioner’s certiorari petition did not clearly frame this issue separately; it appears only in the context of the
question relating to the Miranda warnings issue. It was, however, argued in the
briefs.” Id.
180
Id.
181
See infra note 253.
182
See infra notes 282–86 and accompanying text.
183
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030.
184
See id.
178
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185

Amendment and redaction issues.
More accurately, the Court of
186
Appeals raised and decided the Sixth Amendment issue on its own.
The Court of Appeals’ published opinion mischaracterized Fenner’s appellate position. Though Fenner’s brief had not included the
187
Sixth Amendment “critical stage,” right to counsel argument, the
188
court mistakenly asserted that he had “argued in the briefs” in sup189
port of such a right. In actuality, the ruling denying counsel at bail
to indigent defendants was rendered without the benefit of briefing
by the defendant or the bar. Unlike the United States Supreme
Court’s interest in appointing counsel and in welcoming amici briefs
to protect indigent defendants’ right to representation in Gideon v.
190
Wainwright, the Court of Appeals never provided such an opportunity to the outside legal community.
Perhaps even more alarming than not calling for defense and
considering amici briefs, the Court of Appeals decided the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel issue by weighing only one side’s argument and briefing: the State Attorney General’s. The prosecutor’s
Sixth Amendment brief forcefully contended that the Court of Appeals should reject a claim that bail was a critical stage requiring
191
counsel.
The defender filed no supplemental reply to the State’s
192
constitutional argument.
Indeed, the only time Fenner’s defender mentioned the Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel argument was briefly during oral argu193
ment. The defender initially tried to place the judges of the Court

185

During oral argument, Fenner’s appellate defender briefly referenced the
Sixth Amendment critical stage analysis. See infra notes 193–202.
186
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030–33.
187
Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 9–19, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88)
(stating only two grounds: the Fifth Amendment and the redaction issue).
188
See supra note 179. No such argument, however, appeared in Fenner’s brief.
189
See Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.12.
190
372 U.S. 335 (1963); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
191
The State’s brief contended that the right to counsel had not attached at Fenner’s bail proceeding because he was not facing “formal adversary judicial proceedings” and that a bail review hearing is not such a proceeding. Brief of Respondent at
20, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d (No. 88) (citing Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004);
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180
(1984)).
192
The defender’s only other point heading addressed the trial court’s redacted
statement. He argued redaction made the statement vague, misleading, and inadmissible. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–10, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88).
193
See Taped Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 [hereinafter Taped Transcript of Oral Argument] (on file with author).
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of Appeals in the role of Fenner’s bail review judge by suggesting
that, had they been the presiding bail judge, each would have taken
195
measures to “stop this guy [Fenner] from talking” and would have
196
asked narrow questions concerning bail. The high court, however,
showed little interest in accepting this role or in applying Miranda to
197
a bail hearing and creating an exclusionary rule barring an ac198
cused’s bail statement at trial. After the judges appeared unsympathetic to Fenner’s plight of speaking without having conferred with

194

The defender asked the Court of Appeals “to imagine yourselves, transport
yourselves, to the district court. You’re sitting at a bail review, and this is what you
hear as they ask the accused, ‘Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself,
sir?’” Id. at 1. The defender proceeded to read Fenner’s statement until a judge interrupted and showed little inclination to respond to the defender’s scenario: “Your
position is that this is a custodial interrogation at a bail review hearing.” Id. at 2.
195
Id. at 3.
196
The defender suggested that the bail review judge might have properly asked
bail-related questions that were not connected to the criminal charge. “Why can’t a
[judge] ask narrowly tailored questions like: Are you employed? Do you have community ties? . . . [A]re you married? Do you have children? Those sorts of things to
help to determine bail.” Id. at 4.
197
The inquiring judge expressed strong concern that informing an accused
about the right to counsel would delay the bail proceedings:
JUDGE (MALE #2): . . . So look at Miranda warnings and all of them
say I want a lawyer. It’s just one of the ideas to qualify him for a lawyer
today. Now you’ve got Edwards into it and can’t ask him anything.
You’ve gotta stop everything ‘cause he says I want a lawyer. How’s the
judge gonna make a bail decision?
...
. . . Now if the first thing after Miranda is he elects a lawyer, want a
lawyer, everything stops. So I want a lawyer. Everything stops.
...
. . . I can’t do anything more at that point.
...
. . . And then what exactly? Well, you know what the jails are gonna
look like?
...
. . . Just look at the implications.
...
. . . of applying Miranda to this.
Id. at 2–4.
198
See Taped Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193, at 2–4. The hearing
continued:
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: . . . So I think that you have to be warned. And
if you’re not, your statements can’t be used against you.
JUDGE (MALE #2): You did this in one context by rule, by making
statements made at plea bargaining inadmissible if the plea doesn’t go
down. That was done by rule, not by invoking any constitutional
[right]. Wouldn’t this be the same thing? It’s just a matter of public
policy.
Id. at 6.
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counsel, the defender tried a different approach. He mentioned that
199
“even the sixth amendment” explained the need for legal representation at bail, but the court swiftly dismissed the Sixth Amendment’s
relevance.
[Public Defender]: I just think that there is this dance that is
done between the judge and the defendants: tell me about yourself. It’s a strange . . . [cutoff by judge].
...
. . . I mean, as far as the constitutional question goes, as we
move to the fifth amendment right to counsel and right to silence
and even the sixth amendment right to counsel, there is this strange
gap.
Judge (female #1): You’re not suggesting there is a sixth amendment right to counsel here?
[Public Defender]: Yeah, I think I am. That’s part of what the
argument was in Schmidt and that’s . . . [cutoff by judge].
Judge (female #1): You’re saying the sixth amendment right to
counsel touches at a bail hearing?
[Public Defender]: I think that this court can determine pursuant to the charging documents we receive at this bail hearing,
which, I would argue, is much more like an arraignment than [a]
bail hearing, thus triggering as a proof of stage [i.e., a critical
stage] or as an adversarial proceeding [which would trigger] . . .
the sixth amendment [right] of counsel. And you can do that
without offending the Constitution because states have . . . [cutoff
by judge].
...
. . . And you could see he’s charged with felonies . . . . But
there’s no reason you couldn’t back it up and say, look he’s
200
charged. The prosecution has begun.

The limited dialogue abruptly concluded when the Court of Appeals
201
judges returned to other Fifth Amendment concerns.
The defender said nothing further about the Sixth Amendment during his
202
remaining time.
The court heard no response from the defender
or the outside legal community when the appellate prosecutor dis203
missively opposed the Sixth Amendment claim to counsel at bail.
199

Id. at 7.
Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added).
201
See id. at 8.
202
See id. at 8–12.
203
During oral argument, the prosecuting Assistant Attorney General summarily
dismissed the contention that Fenner had the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
[ATTORNEY GENERAL]: . . . On the right to counsel, clearly there is
no constitutional right to counsel here. That does not attach until
there has been a preliminary hearing, the filing of a criminal informa200
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The Court Ruling: Rejecting Bail as a Critical Stage

The Court of Appeals embraced the State’s “fully argued” position and denied indigent defendants’ right to a lawyer when they ap204
pear before a district court bail review judge. From the outset, the
court evidenced an interest in deciding the constitutional issue. The
court overlooked Fenner’s failure to raise and preserve the Sixth
205
Amendment right to counsel during the suppression hearing,
which is usually a fatal procedural flaw. Instead, the court transformed Fenner’s Fifth Amendment denial of counsel claim into a
critical stage analysis. It inaccurately asserted that Fenner had raised
the Sixth Amendment position when he “contend[ed] that the Circuit Court judge erred in allowing his statement to be admissible at
206
trial due to his lack of legal counsel at the bail review hearing.”
Fenner’s trial attorney, however, had not argued the Sixth Amendment to the circuit court judge, thus explaining why Fenner’s appellate defender limited his certiorari petition and brief to the Fifth
Amendment argument.
The court’s Sixth Amendment analysis reveals the danger of appellate judges deciding a constitutional issue without zealous and vigorous advocacy from both parties and the legal community. Although the State filed criminal charges against Fenner and a judicial
officer had set bail, the court stated that “adversarial judicial criminal
207
proceedings” had not yet commenced that would have entitled him

tion or a circuit court arraignment. These charges were not triable in
the district court. The district court did not have jurisdiction to try
these cases. Clearly, there was no right to counsel here.
Taped Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193, at 10.
204
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1031 (Md. 2004). The court relied
on a prior Court of Special Appeals ruling in Hebron v. State, 281 A.2d 547 (Md.
1971). Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1031. Referring to Maryland Rule 4-213, the court declared that the right to counsel was limited to critical stages of a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 1033. The court never connected counsel’s absence at the time Fenner made
his statement to a critical stage “where the defense on the merits would be impaired.”
Id. at 1031 (quoting United States v. Hooker, 418 F.Supp. 476, 479 (M.D. Pa. 1976),
aff’d mem., 547 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977)). The court
also never connected counsel’s absence at the time Fenner made his statement to
causing “‘potential substantial prejudice’ to ‘the defendant’s basic right to a fair
trial.’” Id. (quoting Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979) (quoting
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967))).
205
See infra note 215.
206
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030.
207
Id. at 1031 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered] at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.’”) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
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to counsel. The court’s technical distinction between a prosecutor
not commencing prosecution by filing charges, compared to initiating a “formal” accusation through indictment or information, went
unchallenged. So, too, did the court’s unexplained differentiation
between the right to counsel “attaching” at an indigent defendant’s
“formal” arraignment but not applying to lower court arraignment
proceedings conducted before judicial officers who advise an accused
208
of the charges and his or her rights.
Having concluded that Fenner, though facing criminal charges,
did not have the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because adversarial proceedings had unexplainably not commenced, the Court of Appeals next considered the State’s argument that Fenner’s bail hearing
was not a “critical” proceeding that required the State to provide a
lawyer. Had Fenner been “‘confronted, just as at trial, by the proce209
dural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both . . . .’”? Was the
courtroom exchange between the bail review judge and Fenner the
type of situation that “‘might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce
210
the trial to a mere formality.’”? Had the Sixth Amendment critical
stage issue been preserved and certified, an advocate would have vigorously responded in the affirmative. The advocate could have
pointed out that Fenner faced a prosecutor and a judge without
counsel and was “confronted” by the procedural intricacies and nuances of a bail system when faced with the judge’s question, “Is there
anything you’d like to tell me about yourself?” The advocate could
have asserted that “the result of this judicial confrontation,” Fenner’s
statement, arguably shaped his fate at trial. The advocate could have
applied the same case law that the Court of Appeals cited and con211
tended that Fenner’s “adversary confrontation” with the judge and
212
prosecutor had “impaired” his defense “on the merits” by produc-

689 (1972))); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625 (1986).
208
See Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020.
209
Id. at 1031 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
210
Id. (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189).
211
Id. (quoting Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979)); see also United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 319 (1973). In Ash, Justice Blackmun noted that a lawyer’s presence is critical to balance “any inequality in the adversary process” and to
assure that there is “no possibility . . . that the accused might be misled by his lack of
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.” Ash, 413 U.S.
at 317–19.
212
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1974). In Gerstein, Justice Powell explained that the Court had identified a critical stage as a pretrial procedure “that
would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without
counsel.” Id. (citations omitted).
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ing evidence that caused “substantial prejudice” to his “basic right to
213
Counsel could have refuted the court’s view that the
a fair trial.”
bail hearing had only been “for the purpose of setting the appropri214
ate amount of bail.” An advocate would have asserted that Fenner’s
statement had been crucial prosecutorial evidence and derogated his
right to be judged fairly at trial. No advocate, however, delivered an
alternative perspective to the State’s position.
This sua sponte ruling denied indigents an opportunity to reply
and take issue with the court’s declaration that they had no constitutional right to counsel at bail. Ruling without legal briefs by the defendant and absent advocacy from the legal community interested in
fulfilling Gideon’s promise, Fenner silenced an entire class from arguing that the fundamental constitutional right to counsel should extend to bail proceedings. Part IV of this Article explains why such
broad, class-based sua sponte practices are strongly discouraged.
IV. APPELLATE COURTS’ SUA SPONTE PRACTICE
The troubling Fenner scenario stands in stark contrast to the
manner in which appellate courts generally decide criminal appeals
and rule on issues of constitutional dimension. In approaching such
questions, the parties are usually aware of the issues that an appellate
court plans to consider. They submit legal briefs to persuade the
judges to rule in their favor. Like most states’ rule on preservation,
Maryland appellate courts only review issues that had been presented
215
to the trial judge. Issues not raised at trial are generally barred on
direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Thereafter, when the
Court of Appeals considers and grants certiorari review, the court order specifies what questions it will decide. Aside from “a very limited
216
number of circumstances,” appellate advocates are clear that at this
final level of judicial scrutiny, the Court of Appeals will “consider only
217
an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari.” Certifying questions for high court review not only informs the parties, but
213

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1031.
215
MD. R. 8-131(a) provides that, “Ordinarily the appellate court will not decide
any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”
None of these exceptions applied to Fenner.
216
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (citation omitted).
217
MD. R. 8-131(b). See also supra note 178; Holbrook v. State, 772 A.2d 1240 (Md.
2001); Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (Md. 1992); McCray v. State, 501 A.2d 856
(Md. 1985); Dempsey v. State, 355 A.2d 455 (Md. 1976).
214
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also enables those who are affected by the ruling to submit an amicus
brief, sometimes at the court’s invitation, to protect non-litigants’
218
rights.
As explained below, the Fenner court’s sua sponte constitutional
ruling denying counsel at bail deviated dramatically from conventional appellate practice. On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the Sixth Amendment claim that the defense never
219
raised or argued at trial or preserved for appeal. Then, the Court
of Appeals also ruled on the same constitutional issue, although it
220
had not certified it when granting certiorari. In reaching that decision, Maryland’s high court failed to consider a defense or amicus
brief that could have provided an accused’s perspective. Indeed, the
court heard only from one side: the State’s. Moreover, indigent defendants, as a class, had no input in the decision-making process.
While an appellate court’s sua sponte power may be invoked to decide an issue neither briefed nor certified, courts are expected to ex221
ercise such discretion in the “most extraordinary” circumstances
only. Fenner was not the exceptional situation. In sum, by not providing notice and ensuring the full participation of the defense and legal
community, the Fenner court undermined the adversarial process and
raised a serious question about the ruling’s legitimacy and acceptance
222
within legal circles.
A. Maryland Appellate Court Practice
1.

Preservation of issues

In an adversarial system, advocates assume the crucial role and
responsibility for identifying disputed issues and assisting appellate
judges in the search for fair and just outcomes. In appealing a criminal conviction, defense counsel is duty-bound to target trial rulings
believed to constitute reversible error because they arguably deprived
the defendant of a fair trial or otherwise infringed a constitutional or
statutory right. Basic to appellate review is the requirement of preservation; a lawyer must raise and make an adequate record of an issue

218

MD. R. 8-511.
See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (granting certiorari
on the Fifth Amendment Miranda issue and the court’s redacted version of Fenner’s
statement); see supra note 187.
220
See id.
221
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199; see infra note 230.
222
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
219
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at trial, or else the matter is considered waived and non-reviewable on
223
appeal.
224
In Fenner’s direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, he
urged reversal of the trial judge’s Fifth Amendment suppression ruling that his lawyer had argued before trial. Because Fenner’s trial
lawyer never asserted he had been denied his Sixth Amendment or
statutory right to counsel at bail, that issue is usually considered
waived. Consequently, on appeal, Fenner’s defender had a strong
basis for believing that he could not raise the constitutional or statutory right to counsel argument. Nevertheless, the Court of Special
Appeals proceeded to rule, sua sponte, that bail is not a critical stage
225
that requires representation. In its ruling, the intermediate appel226
late court never identified the “extraordinary” circumstance or explained how Fenner fell within permissible judicial boundaries for ex227
ercising judicial discretion to address a non-preserved issue.
223

See supra note 215. MD. R. 8-131(a) limits appellate review to issues raised before the trial court but gives the appellate court discretion to decide non-preserved
issues “if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and
delay of another appeal.” Id. In Fenner, neither exception applied. The sua sponte
ruling affirming the conviction meant that there would not be a second trial, and the
appellate court’s raising of a separate constitutional ground did not reduce expense
and delay in the appellate process. See also Holbrook v. State, 772 A.2d 1240 (Md.
2001); McCray v. State, 501 A.2d 856 (Md. 1985); Dempsey v. State, 355 A.2d 455
(Md. 1976).
224
In Maryland, a convicted defendant has the right to appeal erroneous trial rulings directly to the Court of Special Appeals. Wilson v. State, 399 A.2d 256 (Md.
1979). If the intermediate court affirms the finding, the defendant may ask the
Court of Appeals to exercise its discretionary power and grant certiorari review of a
particular question.
225
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. See also MD. R. 8-301.
226
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199.
227
In County Council of Prince George’s County v. Offen, 639 A.2d 1070, 1074 (Md.
1994), the Court of Appeals stated that there were limited circumstances when an
appellate court could decide an issue not raised at trial or by the litigants. The court
stated: “We have recognized on occasion that an appellate court possesses discretion
to consider matters that were not relied upon by the trial judge, or perhaps not even
raised by the parties. This discretion, however, is not unbridled.” (internal citations
omitted). Sua sponte rulings would be appropriate in the following situations:
(a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon,
and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings[; and]
(b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation.
The court went on to recognize a third exception, (c) that “because of important
public policy considerations, there is a limited category of issues, in addition to jurisdiction, which an appellate court ordinarily will address even though they were not
raised by a party [including exhaustion of administrative remedies, maybe standing
of party].” The court further recognized a fourth exception, (d) where an appellate
court might raise an issue sua sponte in a situation in which a lower court decided a

COLBERT FINAL.DOC

2006]
2.

3/7/2006 10:42:20 AM

INDIGENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL

693

Certification

Following Fenner’s unsuccessful appeal, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari and expanded the disfavored sua sponte practice
by considering the non-certified Sixth Amendment issue on the merits. Established practice rules for certiorari review require the high
court to examine only issues identified in a defendant’s petition and
228
to certify questions deemed worthy of further consideration. Since
Fenner’s certiorari petition had not raised the Sixth Amendment issue, the Court of Appeals did not certify that question. Consistent
with usual Maryland procedure, the court should have limited review
229
to the trial judge’s Fifth Amendment suppression ruling. Certiorari
review is usually restricted to certified issues, although practice rules
permit the high court’s intervention in “‘a very limited number of cir230
cumstances [that] have been treated as “extraordinary.”’”
While
court decisions delineate a wide range of recognized exceptions to
the certification rule, none seemingly justified the Fenner court’s sua
231
sponte action.
Indeed, as explained below, the Court of Appeals’
case correctly but reached its result through faulty analysis. Id. at 1075 (internal citations omitted). None of these exceptions would have applied in Fenner: (a) and (b)
pertain to a non-existent retrial and (d) is irrelevant since the lower court had not
ruled on the Sixth Amendment issue. The court never explained or justified its ruling on (c)’s broad public policy exception. See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d
1020 (Md. 2004).
228
MD. R. 8-131(b) states:
Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari,
in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals . . .
the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has
been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that
has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.
Id.; see also Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 396 (Md. 2000); Wynn v. State, 718 A.2d 588 (Md.
1998); McMorris v. State, 355 A.2d 438 (Md. 1976).
229
Court of Special Appeals’ rulings are reviewable only if the question is “raised
in the petition for certiorari.” MD. R. 8-131(b). See supra note 178. Fenner raised
only the Fifth, not the Sixth, Amendment issue. See supra note 12.
230
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting Prof’l Staff Nurses v.
Dimensions Health Corp., 695 A.2d 158, 161 (Md. 1997)). See also McMorris, 355
A.2d at 443 n.4 (“[E]xcept in most extraordinary circumstances, we will consider on
an appeal resulting from a grant of a writ of certiorari only those questions raised in
the petition and matters relevant to those questions . . . .” (quoting Walston v. Sun
Cab Co., Inc., 298 A.2d 391, 396 (Md. 1973)). See supra text accompanying note 221.
231
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered “extraordinary circumstances” to include consideration of:
[a] jurisdictional questions, [b] whether a trial court’s order was appealable, [c] a non-constitutional issue that will enable the Court to
avoid a constitutional question presented, [d] whether the case has become moot, [e] the question whether the trial court has either failed to
render a particular type of judgment required in the action . . . or has
rendered a type of judgment that is beyond the court’s authority, [f]
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Sixth Amendment decision virtually turned one of the “most extraor232
dinary” exceptions on its head.
Appellate courts’ rationale for disfavoring sua sponte rulings is
clear. Deciding “new” issues not briefed and fully argued is inconsistent with guaranteeing fundamental due process and fairness to liti233
gants and interested parties. Appellate review seeks to provide notice and a fair opportunity for everyone who has an interest in the
matter, or who may be affected by the decision, to speak and be
234
heard. Guaranteeing such due process is essential to the “integrity”
of a system that relies on lawyers’ prepared argument and competing
positions.
In Fenner, certification had additional meaning. Since the Court
of Special Appeals’ unreported denial of counsel opinion had been
unpublished, the outside legal community was unaware of the sweeping decision and could not be expected to intervene by submitting an
amicus brief. Certification was the only means of alerting interested
state government sovereign immunity under Maryland law, and [g]
where the failure of the Court to consider an issue would result in the
violation of an important public policy, such as the requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted.
State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 616 (Md. 1996) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (footnotes
and citations omitted). Exceptions (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) are irrelevant, (g) is too
broad and its applicability is not explained, and (c) is completely opposite the Fenner
court’s approach.
232
The Fenner court never considered the relevant Public Defender Act that could
have justified ruling sua sponte on statutory grounds to avoid the constitutional issue.
See infra at 287–94. Instead, the court reached out to decide the constitutional Sixth
Amendment issue and neglected the statutory argument. See Fenner v. State (Fenner
IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1030 (Md. 2004).
233
Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 253–63 (2002) (citing Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Milani and Smith
state:
Allowing a party to submit briefs and arguments on what the party believes to be the issues, but denying that party the opportunity to be
heard on the issue the court deems dispositive, is akin to granting citizens free speech but barring them from speaking on issues of public
concern. In both situations, the exception renders the right meaningless.
Id. at 268–69; see also Barry Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253 (2002) (arguing
against sua sponte decisions and urging court notification to the parties within an
adversarial system); Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (1994) (criticizing the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for deciding issues not briefed and
arguing that the circuit court should respect the parties’ framing of the issue while
fulfilling its obligation to do justice).
234
Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 245, 247.
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parties about the potential wide-ranging impact of the intermediate
court’s ruling. Denying notice, on the other hand, reveals the limited
value placed on amicus participation during the judicial decisionmaking process.
3.

Critiquing Appellate Courts’ Sua Sponte Practice

When appellate courts deviate from established adversarial
process and exercise their judicial discretion to decide broad issues
sua sponte, they are vulnerable to deserved criticism. Judges and
commentators join in criticizing such courts for becoming “self235
directed boards of legal inquiry,” and for assuming an authoritarian
model of decision-making, rather than exhibiting a commitment to
236
judicial “neutrality and passivity.” An appellate court’s activism and
circumvention of established procedure is not trivial. As Supreme
Court Justice Scalia explained: “The rule that points not argued will
not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience;
its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our
237
adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.” Within such
a system, an appellate court that endorses the non-adversarial, unilateral judicial model of decision-making typically silences one of the
parties or, at best, treats the litigant as a minor actor. When a court
takes such action, it should provide the rationale for exercising sua
sponte power so as to overcome the appearance of having prejudged
or preferred an outcome, a troubling image for a judiciary bent on
being viewed as the quintessential impartial arbiter.
Even then, an activist court’s readiness to decide a question not
briefed or fully argued may subject the ruling to considerable skepticism and doubt. Understandably, litigants and the public are less

235

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards
of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented
and argued by the parties before them.”).
236
Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 279, 277–82 (noting that the basic principle
of the adversarial system is a “neutral and passive” decision-maker); STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 2 (1988) (“[N]eutrality and passivity are essential not only to ensure
an evenhanded consideration of each case but also to convince society at large that
the judicial system is trustworthy.”).
237
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). In
another concurring opinion, Justice Scalia recognized that “there are times when
prudence dictates the contrary” and when an appellate court should rule on its own.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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willing to accept a judicial holding that has ignored their viewpoint
238
than one that invited them to share knowledge and perspective.
Additionally, the missing input and perspective from adversaries
and affected parties makes a court more susceptible to deciding a
239
case wrongly.
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner described the increased judicial risk as “taking a leap into the un240
known.” Other commentators condemn a practice whereby an appellate court reaches decisions without hearing from the parties most
affected, charging that it is “both illegal and imprudent for appellate
241
courts to ‘play God.’”
These commentators urge courts to follow
the adversarial process in an effort to reduce the possibility that reviewing judges will be uninformed and will reach decisions by relying
on “assumption[s] that simply [are] incorrect and w[ere] not
242
raised.” The Fenner court, for instance, seemed less troubled about
238

Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 282–86. Milani and Smith argue that it is
important to give the losing party the opportunity to be heard to “enhance the
chances that litigants and society will believe that the losing party was given a fair opportunity to present his case.” Id. at 286. The authors contend that denying this
fundamental right is inconsistent with due process and with the adversarial system.
Id.
239
Id. at 268, 271 (“One cannot assume that a party, who has a vested interest in
the outcome of the matter, will not be able to shed additional light on the issue and
assist the court in analyzing the issue completely.”). Professor Vestal recognized that
“there is at least a possibility that other facts or other authorities might have been
presented which might have changed the court’s attitude on the matter. But this
opportunity is not given to the losing party.” Allen D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration
in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 493 (1959).
240
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). An American Bar Association Report concluded that it is “[o]nly when [a
judge] has had the benefit of intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he
[or she] feel fully confident of his [or her] decision.” Milani & Smith, supra note
233, at 275. In Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1999), the court declared: “Providing the adversely affected party with notice and an opportunity to be
heard plays an important role in establishing the fairness and reliability of the order.
It avoids the risk that the court may overlook valid answers to its perception of defects in the plaintiff’s [prosecution’s] case.” Id. at 113.
241
Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 252.
242
Id. at 245 n.1 (quoting THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS:
INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 122 (1978)). Milani and Smith
refer to an anonymous appellate judge who explained to an author his reasons for
opposing sua sponte rulings:
We don’t know enough about them. You’re playing God then because you
haven’t had the benefit of the lawyers, the judge below, or the clients, or the evidence. You’re just playing God without a record, and you have to assume a certain competence in your counsel. . . . I’m loath to do it. I
have done it, I guess I really don’t like to do it because it’s too dangerous. There’s nothing worse than a lawyer being beaten by an assumption that simply is incorrect and wasn’t raised.
Id.

COLBERT FINAL.DOC

2006]

3/7/2006 10:42:20 AM

INDIGENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL

697

denying Fenner counsel or Miranda advisements because it “assumed” he had spoken before a sitting judge, in open court, where
243
Had a knowing
the public and impartial observers were present.
advocate challenged these wishful assumptions and explained that
indigent defendants, like Fenner, remain in jail and “appear”
through video broadcast only, the Court of Appeals might have been
244
hard-pressed to overlook counsel’s importance.
The force and legitimacy of criticism against appellate courts’ activism is exemplified by Fenner, where the sua sponte holding deprived other similarly situated defendants of the same constitutional
245
right to counsel without an opportunity to present argument.
At
these moments, an appellate court must control any activist impulses
to abandon the adversarial process and insist upon “a vigorous de246
fense,” as well as a “vigorous prosecution.”
To do otherwise and
rule without hearing from both sides, and without protecting the
class of indigent defendants, jeopardizes that court’s reputation and
respect within the legal community. In 1993, Justice Souter recognized the institutional danger of an appellate court deciding a constitutional issue without ensuring equal adversarial participation when
the Justice observed that a “constitutional rule announced sua sponte
is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and

243

See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004).
Professor Fuller captured the importance of legal advocacy:
[B]efore a judge can gauge the full force of an argument, it must be
presented to him with partisan zeal by one not subject to the constraints of the judicial office. The judge cannot know how strong an
argument is until he has heard it from the lips of one who has dedicated all the powers of his [and her] mind to its formulation.
Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 31 (Harold J. Berman
ed., 1976).
245
In a concurring opinion in In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045, 812 A.2d
271, 284 (Md. 2002) (Wilner, J., concurring), Judge Wilner criticized the court for
ruling on a constitutional due process issue when the case could have been resolved
on statutory grounds:
The Court reaches out to decide a Constitutional question that it need
not decide . . . and, in so doing, ignores the long-held rule that we do
not decide Constitutional issues when it is not necessary to do so.
The violation of this rather bedrock principle of appellate review
and restraint would be bad enough if the ruling were correct; here, it is
particularly egregious because the ruling is dead wrong.
Id.
246
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572–
73 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)).
244
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247

argument.”
Justice Souter cautioned appellate courts to refrain
from sua sponte decision-making because he feared that the legal
community would give less import to a broad “rule of law unnecessary
to the outcome of a case, especially one not put into play by the par248
ties.” The Justice noted that courts that engage in this brand of judicial activism produce “the sort of ‘dicta . . . which may be followed
249
if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’”
Justice Souter’s acknowledgement of advocates’ role captured
the essence of the adversarial appellate process. Had the Fenner court
invited defense lawyers’ input and participation, it may have reached
a different outcome that recognized an indigent defendant’s statu250
tory right to counsel at the “critical” bail stage. Unquestionably, the
Court of Appeals would have silenced criticism for not explaining its
procedural irregularities. Instead, the court went forward and decided a non-preserved, non-certified issue “not put into play by the
251
parties” or argued below. The court failed to insist upon a “vigor252
ous defense;” rather, the court showed no interest in commanding
Fenner to respond or in inviting the outside community to participate and help protect the interest of indigent defendants. Within
this skewed context, the court’s ultimate outcome and denial of
counsel was predictable.
More surprising, the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicted
with established Maryland appellate practice. Appellate courts are
required to avoid ruling on a constitutional question when they are
253
able to decide the case on non-constitutional grounds.
As described in Part IV.B of this Article, Fenner had a solid statutory claim
to a right to counsel at bail, one that the court previously recognized
247

Id. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme
Court overruled its prior holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that had restricted federal civil rights § 1983 liability to individuals, not municipalities. Monell,
436 U.S. at 663. Justice Powell believed overruling Monroe was appropriate, in part
because the issues in Monroe had “never actually [been] briefed or argued.” Id. at
708 (Powell, J., concurring). Such decisions, said Justice Powell, “may be accorded
less weight” and that “less deference [is owed] to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations.” Id. at 709 n.6.
248
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
249
Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)).
250
See infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
251
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572–73 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
252
See id.
253
McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195, 199 (Md. 2001); State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d
602, 604, 612 (Md. 1996) (avoiding a sweeping decision and resolving the case on
narrow grounds affecting the parties only).
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and considered sufficiently weighty to explain why it was proper to as254
By not addressing this argument,
sert sua sponte or “on its own.”
and by invoking its rare sua sponte power to the detriment of indi255
gent defendants, the Fenner court abused judicial discretion. Simply
stated, both the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the Court of
256
Special Appeals were “unnecessary to the outcome;” the courts already rejected Fenner’s Fifth Amendment argument for nonadmissibility and there was no justifiable reason to decide the Sixth
Amendment issue.
Why then did the Court of Appeals reach for constitutional
questions not raised in Fenner’s certiorari petition, contrary to estab257
lished Maryland policy and procedure? What “most extraordinary
258
circumstance” justified the court’s proactive ruling that extended
certiorari review to issues not argued at trial or certified by the high
court? The court did not answer or explain, leaving the legal com259
munity to speculate on its reasons.
Perhaps most perplexingly, the Court of Appeals omitted men260
tion of McCarter v. State, where the high court unanimously held
261
that the Maryland Public Defender Act required defenders to represent indigent defendants at the initial appearance and at “all

254

See infra Part IV.B.
Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 287–90.
256
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see supra note 215 (quoting Maryland’s preservation rule, which allows non-preserved issues to be decided on appeal “if necessary or desirable to guide
the trial court”).
257
Maryland Rule 8-131(b)(1) states that “[u]nless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of
Special Appeals . . . the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that
has been raised in the petition for certiorari . . . .”
258
See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
259
The Court of Appeals could have believed that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was inextricably linked to Fenner’s Fifth Amendment Miranda right to confer with counsel before waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, but these are
separate and independent arguments. See supra notes 142–52 and accompanying
text. The court might have wanted to send a clear message that it opposed extending Gideon to other “critical” stages of a criminal proceeding, as well as to noncriminal matters. But this should have encouraged the court to invite, not to prevent, the defense bar’s participation and provides no answer as to why the high court
omitted McCarter’s statutory right to counsel. By ruling as it did, the court may have
reopened an old and painful wound, showing insensitivity and hostility to accused
indigent defendants’ right to counsel. See infra notes 297–312 and accompanying
text.
260
770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001).
261
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, §§ 1–14 (Michie 2003).
255
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262

stages” of a criminal proceeding.
McCarter, too, was a sua sponte
right to counsel decision, but one where the issue had been preserved and certified, and where the court explained intervention was
263
justified to avoid ruling upon an extraneous constitutional issue.
The absence of McCarter is a most disturbing feature of the Fenner
court’s ruling and demonstrates what likely can be expected to occur
when a court decides a case without advocates.
B. McCarter v. State

264

When Antwone Paris McCarter first appeared in the District
Court for Wicomico County, Maryland, after being charged with possession of marijuana and paraphernalia, he had not retained a law265
yer.
Questioned by the district court judge, McCarter indicated
that he wanted to be tried by a judge and expressly waived his consti266
When McCarter returned for trial
tutional right to a trial by jury.
267
the following month, he had a public defender at his side. The defender contended that McCarter’s jury waiver was not legally bind268
McCarter, the defender contended, was entitled to consult
ing.
with an attorney before making the crucial decision regarding
269
whether to be tried by a jury or a judge. The defender argued that
270
the choice of “mode of trial is a critical stage of the proceedings.”
271
The court rejected the argument, and McCarter renewed his motion before the trial judge, who also rejected his constitutional claim
and concluded that his waiver decision had been given “knowingly

262

McCarter, 770 A.2d at 200. MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, section 4(d) states that:
Representation by the Office of the Public defender, or by an attorney
appointed by the Office of the Public defender, shall extend to all stages
in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing,
arraignment, trial . . . and appeal, if any, and shall continue until the
final disposition of the cause, or until the assigned attorney is relieved
by the Public Defender or by order of the court in which the cause is
pending.
Id. (emphasis added).
263
See infra notes 282–85.
264
770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001).
265
Id. at 197. McCarter requested a jury trial in the district court, and his case was
then transferred to the circuit court. Id. at 196.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 198.
268
Id.
269
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198.
270
Id.
271
Id.
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272

and voluntarily.”
At McCarter’s bench trial, the judge convicted
273
him of drug possession and issued a ninety-day sentence.
McCarter appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Ap274
peals.
Before it could consider McCarter’s right to counsel argument, however, Maryland’s highest court exercised its unique review275
ing powers and “issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion.” The
Court of Appeals’ decision to bypass the intermediate appellate court
must have surprised the adversaries, who now prepared to argue before the high court whether the constitutional right to counsel applied
to the initial appearance. This was, after all, the “sole issue debated
276
277
by the parties on this appeal” and certified for certiorari review.
Yet the Court of Appeals took a second unexpected approach
that the parties could not have anticipated. It avoided ruling on the
constitutional issue altogether and introduced a legal argument the
defense had not raised: the public defender’s statutory duty to repre278
sent indigent defendants at the initial appearance.
“We issued a
writ of certiorari in this criminal case to determine whether a defendant has a right to counsel at an initial appearance, under Maryland
Rule 4-213(c), at which time the defendant purported to waive his
279
right to a jury trial.”
Maryland’s Public Defender Act, said the
280
court, could resolve the case. The high court explained its reason281
ing for taking the “extraordinary” measure of using its sua sponte
power: “This Court adheres to the established principle that a court
will not decide a constitutional issue when a case can properly be dis-

272

Id.
Id.
274
Id.
275
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198 (citing McCarter v. State, 749 A.2d 172 (Md. 2000)).
Maryland appellate practice rules permit the Court of Appeals to seize jurisdiction as
a matter of judicial discretion: “In a case or proceeding described in this section, the
Court of Appeals also may issue the writ of certiorari on its own motion.” MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 12–201 (Michie 2002); see also Walston v. Sun Cab Co., Inc.,
298 A.2d 391, 395 (Md. 1973) (granting certiorari “when review and determination
by [the Court of Appeals] appears to be ‘desirable and in the public interest.’”) (citations omitted).
276
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 196.
279
Id. MD. R. 4-213(2) provides that “the judicial officer shall advise the defendant that if the defendant appears for trial without counsel, the court could determine that the defendant waived counsel and proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.”
280
See McCarter, 770 A.2d at 196.
281
Id. at 199.
273
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282

posed of on a non-constitutional ground.”
McCarter’s Sixth
Amendment contention that he was entitled to counsel at his initial
appearance fell within this “established principle” and represented
283
“one of ‘a very limited number of circumstances’” where the high
court’s interest in resolving a case on statutory, rather than constitu284
tional, grounds trumped the usual limitations of certiorari review.
“Appellate policy,” declared the court, mandates abstention from
285
“unnecessary . . . constitutional issues,” such as McCarter’s claim
that the initial appearance was a critical stage. Concluding that
McCarter had a statutory right to counsel when he first appeared in
court, the Court of Appeals held that he had been entitled to counsel
at his initial appearance and, therefore, could not have waived his
286
right to a jury trial in the lawyer’s absence.
Had Fenner preserved the right to counsel issue on appeal, the
McCarter court’s legal analysis would have been highly relevant to his
appearance at the bail proceeding. As the McCarter court explained,
the defender’s statutory duty to represent indigent defendants “at all
287
stages in the proceedings” is “significantly broader than the consti288
tutional right to counsel.” The court examined the statute and its
explicit reference to representation at “arraignment” to determine
whether McCarter’s “initial court appearance” fell within the statute’s
289
scope.
The court concluded that legislators used the terms, “ar290
raignment” and “initial appearance,” interchangeably. But instead
of confining the ruling to a technical, statutory construction, the
291
court offered a sweeping right to counsel perspective. Returning to
the Defender Act’s broad language that guaranteed representation at
“all stages,” the Court of Appeals agreed that, “‘All’ means ‘all’ and it

282

Id. (citations omitted). In State v. Raithel, 404 A.2d 264, 267 (Md. 1979), the
court decided the case on evidentiary, rather than Fifth Amendment, grounds and
stated: “[N]othing is better settled than the principle that courts should not decide
constitutional issues unnecessarily.” Id.
283
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (quoting Prof’l Staff Nurses v. Dimensions Health
Corp., 695 A.2d 158, 161 (Md. 1997)).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
288
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 200 (quoting State v. Flansburg, 694 A.2d 462, 465 (Md.
1997)).
289
Id. at 200–01. The State contended that McCarter’s initial appearance was not
an arraignment because McCarter had not entered a plea. Id. at 201. The Court of
Appeals noted that McCarter pled not guilty. Id.
290
Id.
291
McCarter, 770 A.2d at 201.
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encompasses [McCarter’s initial appearance in the district court] re292
The Public Defender Act’s specific
gardless of its categorization.”
examples of when representation is mandated, from custody to arraignment and through trial, were “for purposes of illustration
293
only.” An accused’s right to counsel, concluded the high court, includes a defendant’s initial appearance and presumably extends to
294
“all” subsequent stages, including bail review hearings.
Like the Fenner court, the McCarter court took the unusual action
of ruling sua sponte in a case concerned with indigent defendants’
right to counsel. Procedurally and substantively, however, the differences between the two sua sponte Court of Appeals holdings could
not be greater. In McCarter, the court had certified a right to counsel
issue that had been presented to the trial judge and preserved for
295
appeal.
The court explained the reason for ruling sua sponte; it
had relied on well-settled doctrine for avoiding a constitutional issue
by invoking a statutory argument the parties had not raised. Substantively, McCarter sought to enforce indigents’ right to counsel at the
initial court appearance. In Fenner, the court never articulated the
basis for ruling sua sponte and proactively choosing to reach a constitutional issue that had not been preserved, certified or briefed. Substantively, the court denied indigents a constitutional right to counsel
at bail and did not consider a statutory holding that appeared to
guarantee representation.
What accounted for this difference? McCarter would have provided strong support for Fenner and other indigent defendants’
claim to counsel at bail and to suppression of his statement. But the
Fenner court overlooked McCarter, contrary to a “bedrock principle of
296
appellate review:” do not rule on a constitutional issue when a case
may be decided on statutory grounds.
Both McCarter and Fenner are important pieces in Maryland’s
right to counsel mosaic. Part V of this Article provides additional
context for appreciating what happened in McCarter and Fenner.

292

Id.
Id.; see infra note 316 and accompanying text.
294
See McCarter, 770 A.2d at 201.
295
See id. at 196.
296
See supra note 245 (providing quote of Court of Appeals Judge Wilner’s concurring opinion in In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045, 812 A.2d 271, 284
(Md. 2002)).
293
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V. INDIGENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL
A. The Historic Denial of Representation at Trial
The reasoning in McCarter was not the only piece of legal analysis
missing from the Fenner opinion. The court’s ruling against indigents’ constitutional right to counsel at bail also avoided a historic
context; it never placed Fenner within Maryland’s tortured development of indigents’ right to counsel. Doing so would have helped explain the court’s sua sponte ruling.
During most of Maryland’s history, indigent defendants charged
with serious felony and misdemeanor crimes had no right to an assigned defense lawyer and had no choice but to defend themselves at
297
trial.
Typically, unrepresented defendants routinely waived a jury
298
trial. In Maryland courtrooms, it was a common sight to see an accused attempting to cross examine and question one’s own witnesses
299
before the presiding judge.
In the 1930’s, two United States Supreme Court constitutional
rulings momentarily shifted the national momentum toward extending the right to counsel in state and federal prosecutions. In Powell v.
300
Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that state defendants facing a capital charge had a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
301
302
to assigned counsel.
Several years later in Johnson v. Zerbst, the
297

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942).
Id. at 472 (1942) (“[I]n Maryland the usual practice is for the defendant to
waive a trial by jury.”).
299
See id. In the Supreme Court’s review of Betts’ habeas corpus petition, Justice
Roberts noted that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge Bond, defended
the practice of trial without counsel before a judge, rather than a jury: “Certainly my
own experience in criminal trials over which I have presided (over 2000, as I estimate
it), has demonstrated to me that there are fair trials without counsel employed for
the prisoners.” Id. at 472 n.31 (quoting Chief Judge Bond’s opinion denying the relief requested in Betts’ state petition for a writ of habeas corpus ).
300
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
301
Id. In Powell, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of nine African
American defendants who had been charged with raping two white women because
the defendants did not know their attorney’s identity until the day of trial. Id. at 73.
Although the Court found that counsel’s pretrial appointment was “vital and imperative” to protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the Court declined to extend its
ruling to every state capital and felony prosecution. Id. at 71. The Court explained:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . . .
Id.
298
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment also guaranteed indigent de303
fendants the right to counsel in federal felony prosecutions. How304
ever the momentum subsided five years later in Betts v. Brady, when
the Supreme Court rejected a Maryland habeas petitioner’s due
305
process argument and refused to extend the constitutional right to
306
counsel in state felony prosecutions.
In Betts, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s “usual prac307
tice” of permitting a defendant’s self-representation at a felony trial
where the accused was a person “of ordinary intelligence,” who was
308
“not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure.”
Because Maryland was typical of the majority of states that refused to assign counsel
309
in a felony prosecution, the Supreme Court measured the practice
302

304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. In Zerbst, the habeas petitioner, a United States Marine, was tried without
counsel and convicted in federal court for having feloniously passed and uttered
counterfeit money. Id. at 459–60. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed representation “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions . . . to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Id. at 462.
Relying on Powell, the Court declared that the “right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Id. at
463.
304
316 U.S. 455 (1942). Smith Betts, indicted for robbery and lacking funds,
asked the trial judge to assign counsel. Id. at 456–57. The judge refused, stating that
indigent defendants were entitled to legal representation only when the charge was
murder or rape. Id. at 457. Betts opted for a bench trial. Id. He cross-examined
prosecution witnesses and questioned his own alibi witnesses. Id. The trial judge
convicted Betts and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment. Id.
305
Betts contended that the denial of counsel was “shocking to the universal sense
of justice” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a fair
trial. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 462.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 472 (referring to the Maryland practice of conducting bench trials, not
jury trials, for unrepresented defendants).
308
Id. Betts, 43-years old, was previously convicted and sentenced in a larceny
prosecution. Id. Dissenting, Justice Black described Betts as “a farm hand, out of a
job and on relief,” adding that “[i]t is clear from his examination of witnesses that he
was a man of little education.” Id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
309
The 6-3 Betts majority referred to the “great majority of the states” that did not
consider counsel as a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.” Id. at 471 (majority opinion). The opinion identified twenty-six states which did not guarantee a lawyer in every felony case. Many of these states assigned counsel in capital and serious
or “grave” felony crimes or left it to a judge’s discretion. Nearly half the states,
twenty-one altogether, required appointment “in all cases.” Betts, 316 U.S. at 470.
Virginia, the forty-eighth state, had no constitutional provision requiring a lawyer’s
assistance in a criminal case. Id. at 467. The three dissenting Justices analyzed the
same data and concluded that thirty-five states had a “clear legal requirement or an
established practice” for assigning counsel in serious felonies that they believed entitled Betts to a defender on the charge of robbery. Id. at 477 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
303
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of denying counsel to accused indigents against the constitutional
310
The Betts
commands of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Court concluded that Maryland’s practice of not assigning counsel to
accused felons and of conducting trials without juries were not “of311
fensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness.” For the
next two decades, Maryland continued its practice of prosecuting unrepresented accused felons, as long as a trial judge concluded that
they were not “at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack of
counsel,” or so “handicapped” or “helpless” when defending them312
selves before a judge.
In 1963, states’ criminal defense systems and access to justice for
indigent defendants changed dramatically. That year, in Gideon v.
313
Wainwright, the Supreme Court gave meaning to the constitutional
right to counsel at a felony trial for “any person haled into court, who
314
is too poor to hire a lawyer.”
Gideon’s recognition that the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment concept of due process fundamentally altered the legal
landscape for indigent defendants in state courts. Within the next
decade, the guarantee of counsel also would apply to misdemeanors
315
and to “critical” pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding.
Maryland responded to Gideon by revamping its indigent defense
system and becoming one of a relatively few states to move to a public
defender system. The 1970 Public Defender Act acknowledged the
state’s commitment to Gideon’s promise by guaranteeing counsel “at

310

See id. at 461–65 (majority opinion). The Court conducted a historic analysis
of the constitutions of the original thirteen states and determined that the constraints imposed by the Sixth Amendment only apply to federal trials but that the
“[A]mendment lays down no rule for the conduct of the states.” Id. at 465.
311
Id. at 473. The majority concluded that “[a]t the least, such a construction by
state courts and legislators cannot be said to lack a reasonable basis.” Betts, 316 U.S.
at 466. The majority expressed concern that mandating counsel in every felony
prosecution “straight-jacketed” states to appoint a lawyer when it was not necessary.
Id. at 472. The Court favored states taking a diverse approach. Maryland’s “much
more informal” bench trial, for instance, had “obvious” advantages: “[T]he judge can
much better control the course of the trial and is in a better position to see impartial
justice done than when the formalities of a jury trial are involved.” Id. Dissenting,
Justice Black reached a different conclusion and declared that denying counsel to
Betts and other indigent defendants “has long been regarded as shocking to the
‘universal sense of justice’ throughout this country.” Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
312
Id. at 472–73 (majority opinion).
313
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
314
Id. at 344.
315
See infra note 342.
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316

all stages in the [criminal] proceeding.”
Implementation of the
legislation, however, did not change the practice of nonrepresentation at most Maryland bail and pretrial release proceedings. At the time when McCarter was decided, nine of Maryland’s
twelve judicial districts still did not provide legal representation at an
317
accused’s initial appearance or at bail reviews. The McCarter court’s
sua sponte ruling suggests that the Court of Appeals of Maryland took
advantage of the opportunity to address the reality of Maryland de318
fendants appearing without defenders.
Three years later, however, in deciding against Fenner’s claim to
representation at bail, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reverted to
the past practice of diminishing counsel’s importance. Its sua sponte
Sixth Amendment ruling failed to reference Gideon or the post-Gideon
period in which Maryland law embraced legal representation “at all
319
stages in the [criminal] proceeding.”
The court avoided mention
of the public defender’s duty of representation that would have protected Fenner from speaking and making his inculpatory statement.
The Supreme Court’s conflicting decisions in Betts and Gideon
provide context for understanding Fenner’s and McCarter’s opposite
placement within Maryland’s right to counsel jurisprudence.
McCarter is well situated within the expanded philosophy of guaranteeing counsel to indigent defendants. With Maryland’s Public Defender Act, the legislature acknowledged that counsel was needed to
316

MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A § 4(a) (Supp. 2005). Section 1 of the Public Defender Act indicates that it is “the policy of the State of Maryland to . . . assure effective assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused taken into custody . . . in
criminal and juvenile proceedings . . . and to authorize the Office of Public Defender
to administer and assure enforcement” of the statute. Id. § 1. Section 4 refers to the
“primary duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for any indigent defendant eligible for services,” and specifies particular proceedings “where
possible incarceration . . . may result.” Id. § 4.
317
Maryland’s statewide public defender system does not provide uniform representation at bail proceedings. In 1998, only public defenders in Harford and Montgomery counties represented indigent defendants at bail review hearings. Colbert,
Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1732 n.57.
318
The high court was aware of legislative efforts to extend representation at bail
statewide. During the preceding 1999 and 2000 legislative sessions, the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals, Robert Bell, and the criminal justice community strongly
supported legislation that would have guaranteed public defender representation at
bail. Id. at 1767–69 nn.142–50. In 1999, the bill was narrowly defeated through the
lobbying efforts of the powerful bail bond industry. Id. at 1767. In 2000, the Senate
overwhelmingly passed the bill but the Chair of the House judiciary committee never
permitted the bill to come to a vote. Id. at 1768–69 & nn. 153–54. By construing the
Public Defender Act to mandate representation at the initial stage, the McCarter
court addressed the issue directly and made new legislation unnecessary.
319
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A § 4(a) (Supp. 2005).
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advocate for “men of intelligence,” as well as “for the ignorant and
320
illiterate [and] those of feeble instinct.” Maryland’s statutory guarantee of counsel “at all stages” fits easily within Gideon’s “noble
321
ideal.”
Fenner, on the other hand, belongs on the limited side of
Maryland’s constitutional right to counsel jurisprudence alongside
Betts, whose self-defense at a felony trial was not considered “offensive
322
to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness.”
In this restricted realm, an appellate court is less concerned with an accused’s
procedural guarantees of a fair trial, even when the unrepresented
accused provides substantial assistance to the prosecution’s proof of
guilt at his trial.
Maryland’s historic right to counsel trajectory may be similar to
the path in other states that have failed to guarantee representation
to accused indigents. Its legacy of denying counsel at bail proceedings coincide with the “great majority” of states that also refuse to
provide counsel at bail proceedings. As Part V.B of this Article describes, most state and local courts still refuse to acknowledge the “in323
tricate, complex and mysterious” world that Donald Fenner and
other defendants enter when they appear alone at their initial appearance and speak in response to a judicial officer’s inquiry. Unless
state judiciaries are prepared to revisit their historic perspective, they
are likely to follow Fenner’s reasoning and find nothing objectionable
about admitting at trial statements uttered by an unrepresented defendant at a bail proceeding.
B. The National Implications of Fenner
Throughout the country, many indigents first experience a
324
state’s criminal justice system without a lawyer. When they appear
320

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
322
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). The Court added that “while want of
counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental
fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] amendment embodies an inexorable
command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” Id.
323
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). See supra notes 302–03.
324
See Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–24.
[I]n a country that prides itself on guaranteeing poor people equal access to justice, eighteen states do not provide lawyers at this initial proceeding anywhere within their borders. The remaining twenty-four
states decline to provide representation at bail in all but a few of their
counties. Only eight states and the District of Columbia uniformly protect an indigent person's need for counsel at the bail stage.
Id.
321
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before a judicial officer, who will determine whether they are released on recognizance or given bail pending trial, indigent defendants often must act as their own advocate. Indeed, only eight states
guarantee counsel at an accused’s arraignment or initial appearance
325
statewide. Twice as many states deny counsel everywhere within its
326
borders; others provide for a lawyer’s representation in one or two
327
select jurisdictions.
Most states decline to consider the contradictions of a criminal justice system that professes equal justice and presumes innocence for the poor, while denying counsel to accused indigents at the bail stage and incarcerating those who cannot afford
bail. Justice Scalia captured the dilemma of defendants’ “Dicken328
sian” experience during the initial 48-hour, post-arrest period of jail
detention as they “await the grace of a . . . bureaucratic machine [to]
329
. . . churn[] its cycle.” Most are without counsel when they finally
appear before a judicial officer in a state’s pretrial system that resists
accepting an “obvious truth that the average defendant does not have
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
330
tribunal with power to take his . . . liberty.” Most states refuse to invest the necessary resources for assigned counsel’s immediate representation at a bail hearing that triggers “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . , that is to say, from the time of . . .
331
arraignment . . . until the beginning of . . . trial . . . .” It is at this
initial stage when an accused’s quest to regain liberty may result in

325

Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West 1998) (California); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 541b (West 1994) (Connecticut); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 44 (Delaware); FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.130(C)(1) (Florida); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 8 (Massachusetts); N.D. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44
(North Dakota); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 44 (West Virginia); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.02 (WEST
1985 & SUPP. 1996) (Wisconsin).
326
See generally Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–24.
327
See generally id.
328
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329
Id. While awaiting a judicial officer’s probable cause determination, Justice
Scalia addressed the plight of the “ordinary” and “presumptively innocent” person
accused of a crime.
Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled
to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it churns its
cycle for up to two days—never once given the opportunity to show a
judge that there is absolutely no reason to hold him, that a mistake has
been made. In my view, this is the image of a system of justice that has
lost its ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans would
recognize as our own.
Id.
330
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938); see supra notes 302–03.
331
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
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saying something that ultimately jeopardizes the right to obtain a fair
trial.
Surely that was true for Donald Fenner. His effort to persuade
the bail review judge to reduce bail not only failed, but his words be332
came a crucial piece of the prosecutor’s case at trial.
Fenner’s dilemma is not unusual, as indigent defendants across the nation speak
333
without lawyers and make damaging statements at bail hearings. A
judge interested in hearing the “truth” may easily rationalize asking
an unsuspecting and uncounseled defendant to “say something,”
without warning that the reply may later be admitted at trial. Judges
are not the only state actors who may be instrumental in causing an
accused to speak. A prosecutor’s provocative comment may generate
a defendant’s response to correct an exaggerated or wrongful assertion about the extent of criminal involvement or strength of the government’s case.
While there is no way to know the extent to which Maryland
prosecutors will look to bail proceedings to discover evidentiary nuggets to include in their case against an accused, Fenner’s bail hearing
illustrates why these proceedings represent an untapped source and
potential goldmine for prosecutors in their search for additional evidence. A skilled prosecutor will now examine the bail hearing and
study the defendant’s reply to a judicial officer’s inquiry and other
remarks. While actual trials are rare, prosecutors could also use a defendant’s recorded or transcribed statement during pretrial negotiations to induce guilty pleas and further limit trial rights. If a trial occurs, defense lawyers would find it exceedingly difficult to overcome
the weight that fact-finders place on a defendant’s recorded or transcribed admission. Following conviction, appellate defenders should
expect the same result as Fenner’s attorney when he unsuccessfully
challenged the trial court’s ruling. Such statements by a criminal defendant will likely be found voluntary or spontaneous.
Fenner should dramatically change the nature of a prosecutor’s
pretrial investigation and trial preparation by shifting attention to the
importance of the bail hearing. In the defender’s absence, state actors will assume a greater role in influencing what occurs there. A
judge, for instance, who has the reputation of favoring the prosecution, may see bail as the opportunity to ask and encourage an unrepresented defendant to speak. A prosecutor, too, may try to take advantage and mislead an accused into speaking and uttering an

332
333

See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 174.
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incriminating statement to be used toward conviction at trial. Judges
and prosecutors must be aware of the consequences to an accused’s
right to a fair trial. Minimally, they should inform an accused of
Miranda advisements, although this is likely to convince only some
unrepresented defendants to refrain from speaking. To fully achieve
this objective, an accused must have an attorney present.
Predictably, other states will soon be deciding similar Fenner admissibility issues. They will be tempted to, but should resist, following
the Maryland high court’s ruling. Fenner had not preserved and
therefore had not argued his right to counsel at bail. Had full argument occurred, he and every indigent defendant would have had a
very strong constitutional argument that bail ought to be considered
a “critical stage,” and a powerful basis for convincing the Court of
Appeals to follow McCarter’s statutory entitlement to legal representation. In brief, a defense attorney’s presence at a bail hearing was the
334
type of critical “event” that mandated counsel to ensure Fenner received a fair trial. Had an attorney been present, she and not Fenner
would have spoken and advocated for pretrial release. Fenner’s silence would have left the prosecutor with considerably less impressive
evidence and, arguably, inconclusive proof of guilt at trial.
What then should other state appellate courts do when reviewing the practice of non-representation in the lower court? Which of
the two trends, acceptance or rejection of a right to counsel at bail,
should a state court follow when faced with the issue of whether to
admit or suppress statements from an unrepresented defendant who
speaks at a bail hearing? One thing is certain: procedurally, appellate
courts should refrain from sua sponte rulings on a non-certified, non335
preserved constitutional issue of such a “fundamental character”
that directly challenges the system’s ability to achieve equality and
fairness for indigent defendants. When deciding whether an unrepresented defendant’s inculpatory statement ought to be admitted or
suppressed and other issues of such vital importance, courts must appreciate the legal and “moral imperative” of ensuring defense counsel’s full participation before deciding whether to travel the Gideon
336
337
path or take a Betts detour.

334

Utt v. Warden, Balt. City Jail, 427 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
(holding that because a governor’s extradition hearing does not touch upon an accused’s guilt or innocence, it was not a critical stage “where events occur that can affect the entire trial”).
335
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
336
See supra Part V.A.
337
See supra Part V.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
An appellate court’s power to rule sua sponte should be used
338
only in “most extraordinary” circumstances.
Full appreciation of
the high stakes of ruling without defense briefs and full participation
should persuade an appellate court to act with extreme caution, especially when the non-argued constitutional issue involves the rights
of an entire class of accused indigents. When a court determines sua
sponte ruling is absolutely necessary, it should take safeguards to ensure a court’s ruling receives respect and legitimacy within the legal
community.
When an appellate court is considering ruling on a constitutional issue neither preserved for review nor briefed by both parties,
it must take proactive measures and direct the litigants to respond.
Ordering supplemental briefing ensures that the appellate court
hears from parties who are most familiar with the issue. Since the ruling affects non-litigants’ rights, the appellate court must inform the
outside community that it intends to decide an undeclared or noncertified issue. Publishing judicial decisions and court orders is the
optimal way to notify the legal community of an appellate court’s intention; it also permits interested outsiders to file amicus briefs to assist judicial decision-makers with reaching a correct ruling. Additionally, appellate courts should invite affected parties to file amici briefs
and consider the appointment of an independent, partisan advocate
339
to protect the interests of non-litigants. Such appointments ensure
that judges have a complete factual understanding of the circumstances that unrepresented defendants face at the bail stage and
340
avoid any appearance of a defender’s conflict of interest.
In Fenner, the Court of Appeals denied indigent defendants a
341
right to counsel at bail without full argument.
In such instances,
338

See supra notes 221, 230.
In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the United States Supreme
Court invited then Professor (and now Circuit Court Judge) Paul Cassell to orally argue and defend Congress’s power to pass a law that sought to overrule Miranda’s requirements. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 n.7. The Attorney General declined to do so.
See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 681 n.14 (4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme
Court stated: “Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of
§ 3501’s constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our
deliberations by arguing in support of the judgment below.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
443 n.7.
340
The reference is to a Public Defender conflict of interest if the defender is required to represent indigent defendants without adequate resources at bail hearings
should the Sixth Amendment or statutory right to counsel prevail.
341
Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Md. 2004); see infra Part
III.C.3 (discussing the court’s sua sponte denial of the right to counsel).
339
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the court should order a rehearing to restore public confidence in
the impartiality of the judicial process. When an appellate court circumvents its baseline practice rules and decides an issue neither preserved nor certified for review, it must treat these transgressions sufficiently seriously to warrant such an extraordinary remedy. Fenner
and indigent defendants are deserving of the opportunity to present
a critical stage and statutory right-to-counsel argument.
Fenner’s right to present full argument goes beyond protecting
due process rights. It ensures that the appellate court reach the
proper result on the merits. While Fenner’s advocates may, at first,
consider it extremely unlikely that the high court will reverse a prior
decision, they are able to mount a very strong argument. Indeed,
Fenner presents the classic example for why the bail hearing ought to
be considered a “critical” stage and why counsel’s presence would
“help to avoid . . . the potential substantial prejudice inher[ent] in
342
the particular confrontation” between a defendant and a bail judge.
In counsel’s absence, Fenner, like most unrepresented defendants,
spoke in response to the judge’s inquiry and provided crucial evi343
dence for trial. A defense advocate would have immediately interceded and convinced Fenner not to say anything that might “dero344
gate” from his right to a fair trial.
Before Fenner, the Court of Appeals had never ruled on indi345
gents’ constitutional right to counsel at bail, nor considered the
impact of admitting an unrepresented defendant’s statement at trial.
Without a defense perspective, Maryland’s appellate courts could not
envision how Fenner’s statement might have occurred within a coercive environment, how a judge’s open-ended question might compare to an “interrogation” or “a trial like confrontation,” and how
other defendants can be expected to reply in similar situations. In an
adversarial system, full-dressed argument is necessary to provide a defense perspective that was missing from Fenner and that is essential for
appellate judges’ understanding of pretrial detainees’ experience in
the lower bail courts.
342

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
See id. at 224–27 (recounting precedent in favor of representation at any adversarial confrontation).
344
Id. at 226. In Wade, the Supreme Court interpreted “critical stage” to mean
“any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.” Id.
345
Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). In
Mapp, Justice Douglas defended the Court’s sua sponte Fourth Amendment ruling by
asserting that “the arguments of its antagonists and of its proponents have been so
many times marshaled as to require no lengthy elaboration here.” Id.
343
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The spectacle of poor and typically uneducated people defending their liberty and right to a fair trial is no different today than the
one-sided courtroom experience that Clarence Earl Gideon faced
346
forty years ago.
While from the Supreme Court’s perspective,
“Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected
347
from a layman,” the same cannot be said about Fenner and others
like him. Today, defendants—whether in Maryland or in other
states—go unrepresented, compelled to speak on their own behalf to
regain liberty before trial. When they do, they risk convicting themselves, contrary to the guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Measuring the impact of admitting an unrepresented indigent
defendant’s inculpatory statement at a bail hearing should move appellate courts to chart a course that reestablishes their impartial and
independent role as the protector of an accused’s right to a fair trial.

346
347

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 337.

